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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the district court commit error in failing to 
enter judgment in favor of the defendants-appellants Prodata, 
Inc. ("Prodata1') and Will McCoy ("McCoy") as a matter of law 
based on the jury's findin'g that the defendants conveyed only 
truthful information? 
Standard of Review: Trial court' s determination as to 
issues of law is accorded no deference and will be reviewed for 
correctness. Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. 
Blomauist. 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989). 
2. Viewed in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff-appellee John P. Pratt ("Pratt"), was the evidence at 
trial sufficient to support the jury's finding that, in 
contacting the Utah Department of Transportation (" UDOT"), 
Prodata and McCoy acted with a predominant purpose to injure 
Pratt for the sake of injury alone? 
Standard of Review: Sufficiency of the evidence when 
viewed most favorably to the prevailing party. Hansen v. 
Stewart. 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988). 
3. Viewed in the light most favorable to Pratt, was 
the evidence at trial sufficient to support the jury's finding 
that the acts of Prodata and McCoy were the proximate cause of 
the damages awarded to Pratt? 
-2-
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Standard of Review: Depending on whether this is 
viewed as an issue of law or fact, the standard of review is 
either that set forth in Rpp C&se Rppfjng, supra, or in ftensen, 
gVPPfr- &££ Pennj.pn yT frggrepfl Jpftngpn CpngtrvctlPfl CPt / 701 
P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1985). 
4. Viewed in the light most favorable to Pratt, was 
the evidence at trial sufficient to support the jury' s finding 
that, in contacting UDOT regarding their rights under the 
Agreement, Prodata and McCoy failed to act in good faith thereby 
losing any privilege that might otherwise have protected their 
actions? 
Standard of Review: Sufficiency of the evidence when 
viewed most favorably to the prevailing party. Hansen, supra. 
5. Viewed in the light most favorable to Pratt, was 
the evidence at trial sufficient to support the jury's finding 
that Pratt did not recognize the risk of harm to himself by 
reason of the actions of Prodata and McCoy and thereafter 
intentionally or heedlessly failed to protect his own interests? 
Standard of Review: Sufficiency of the evidence when 
viewed most favorably to the prevailing party. Hansen, supra. 
6. Viewed in the light most favorable to Pratt, was 
the evidence at trial sufficient to support the jury's finding 
that Prodata suffered no damage as the result of Pratt' s breach 
of the Agreement? 
Standard of Review: Sufficiency of the evidence 
viewed most favorably to the prevailing party. Hansen, supra. 
-3-
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HETERMTNATIVE LAW 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is 
determinative of the issues listed above. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
I. Nature of Case 
Pratt filed this action against Prodata, his former 
employer, and McCoy, its agent, seeking recovery of damages 
Pratt allegedly suffered when UDOT discharged him as a 
contractor supplying data processing services. As his theory of 
recovery, Pratt alleged that Prodata and McCoy had intentionally 
interfered with Pratt's economic relations with UDOT both by 
employing an improper means (misrepresentation of facts) and by 
acting with an improper purpose. Pratt also sought a 
declaratory judgment that he was not bound by a covenant not to 
compete he had entered into with Prodata. (R. 2-13.)l 
Prodata and McCoy answered Pratt's Complaint by 
denying that they had made any misrepresentation or that they 
had acted with an improper purpose. Further, Prodata denied 
that Pratt was relieved in any way of his obligations under the 
covenant not to compete. As to the allegations of intentional 
1
 All references to the original record are in the following 
form: "R. " followed by the page number. All references to the 
Reporter's Transcript of Trial Proceedings are in the following 
form: "T," followed by the page number. Trial exhibits are 
designated as follows: "Ex." followed by the exhibit number. 
Finally, items included in the Addendum to this brief are 
referenced first by their source in the record and, thereafter, by 
their order in the addendum ("Addendum " ) . 
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interference with economic relations, Prodata raised as 
affirmative defenses both privilege and Pratt' s intentional 
failure to protect his own interest. Prodata also brought a 
Counterclaim seeking recovery of liquidated damages in the 
amount of $25,000 for violation of the covenant not to compete. 
(R. 90-104. ) 
II. Course of Proceedings 
This matter was tried to a jury on March 19-21, 1991. 
At the conclusion of Pratt' s case, Prodata moved for directed 
verdict on both claims. (T. 380-408. ) The motion was granted 
as to Pratt' s declaratory judgment claim. (R. 755-58 appended 
hereto as Addendum 4. ) Following the jury' s verdict in favor of 
Pratt on both the wrongful interference claim and on the 
Counterclaim, Prodata and McCoy made a timely motion for 
judgment notwithstanding verdict or, in the alternative, for new 
trial. (R. 765-67. ) 
III. Disposition in Trial Court 
The jury found that Prodata and McCoy, acting with an 
improper purpose, had interfered with Pratt' s economic relations 
with UDOT and that the amount of Pratt' s damages was $32, 380. 00. 
However, the jury found that neither defendant had employed 
improper means by making a false statement to UDOT regarding 
Pratt. The jury found that the acts of the defendants were not 
privileged. The jury further found that Prodata had not 
suffered any damages by reason of Pratt' s breach of his covenant 
not to compete. (R. 700-04 also appended hereto as Addendum 5. ) 
-5-
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On March 27, 1991, judgment was entered in favor of Pratt in the 
amount of $34,566.85. On May 20, 1991, the trial court denied 
the defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict or, 
in the Alternative, for New Trial. This appeal was noticed on 
May 21, 1991. 
iv. Statement of Facte 
A. Background—The Parties and the Covenant Not to 
Compete 
Pratt is a computer programmer. The business of 
Prodata (known in Utah as "Pro-Star") is to supply computer 
programmers to industry and governmental entities in need of 
such services. McCoy is Prodata' s City Manager for Salt Lake 
City. (T. 3, 14 and 127. ) 
In September, 1985, Pratt went to work for Prodata 
and, on September 23, 1985, he signed a "Non-Disclosure/Non-
Compete Employment Agreement" with Prodata. (T. 14-15; Ex. 11 
appended hereto as Addendum 1. ) The Employment Agreement 
included a covenant by Pratt not to compete with Prodata as a 
contractor in Salt Lake City for a period of one year after 
termination of his employment. 2 As the exclusive remedy for 
violation of its terms, the covenant not to compete provided for 
liquidated damages in the amount of $25,000. (Addendum 1 at 
paragraph 9.) While employed under the terms of the Employment 
2The trial court found that Pratt' s covenant not to compete 
was valid and enforceable and that it had not been modified or 
superseded. These findings have not been challenged on appeal. 
(Addendum 4 at p. 2; R. 742 [Jury Instruction No. 33] appended 
hereto as Addendum 8. ) 
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Agreement, Pratt performed services at UDOT for Prodata. (T. 
51, 52, 322. ) 
On May 1, 1988, Pratt terminated his employment with 
Prodata. (Pratt continued to work for Prodata for some time 
thereafter under a separate subcontract arrangement. ) (T. 15, 
18-19. ) On February 27, 1989, two months before the expiration 
of his covenant not to compete, Pratt commenced working for UDOT 
in Salt Lake City. (T. 23-24. ) Between that date and May 1, 
198 9, Pratt worked 227 hours for UDOT in violation of the 
covenant not to compete charging UDOT a rate of $4 5.00 per hour 
(versus the $26.50 per hour Prodata paid Pratt). (T. 60-61; Ex. 
2. ) 
B. Background—Pratt and Hartle at UDQT 
Pratt continued to work at UDOT through October 2, 
1989. 3 (T. 2.) Ronald J. Hartle ("Hartle")/ under subcontract 
with Prodata and like Pratt subject to a covenant not to 
compete, also worked as a computer programmer at UDOT in the 
summer of 1989. (T. 281, 285, 288. ) In the summer of 1989, in 
violation of his covenant not to compete with Prodata, Hartle 
signed a contract for services directly with UDOT. Prodata 
became aware of Hartle's contract with UDOT in September, 1989 
when Hartle refused to turn in his August time sheets so that 
Prodata could bill his time to UDOT. (T. 285-86. ) 
3The evidence showed that Pratt did not have a written 
contract with UDOT as of late September, 1989 although he 
continued to work at UDOT. (T. 154; Ex. 6 appended hereto as 
Addendum 2 at paragraph 7. ) 
-7-
Between September 7 and 26, 1989, Prodata through 
McCoy had numerous contacts with UDOT and Hartle regarding 
Hartle's breach of his covenant not to compete. (Ex. 4 appended 
hereto as Addendum 3 at pp. 5-6; T. 286, 329-30.) UDOT was a 
client of Prodata and Prodata did not wish to take action 
regarding Hartle' s covenant not to compete that would adversely 
affect UDOT. (Addendum 2 at paragraph 4; T. 52, 330. ) On 
September 26, 1989, Prodata received a letter from Hartle' s 
attorney citing Prodata' s failure to enforce Pratt's covenant 
not to compete between February 27 and May 1, 1989 as partial 
justification for Hartle's breach. (T. 137; Ex. 15 at p. 2. ) 
That very day, McCoy visited UDOT to review the contract 
documents between UDOT and both Pratt and Hartle. (T. 138-39. ) 
Once he had reviewed these documents, McCoy requested a meeting 
with Harold Worrall ('•Worrall"), UDOT's Comptroller, and Neal 
Christensen ("Christensen"), UDOT's Director of Administrative 
Services. (T. 144-45. ) 
c. The Offending Contact 
On September 27, 1989, McCoy met with Christensen. 
During the course of the meeting, Worrall joined them.4 McCoy 
advised Christensen that Prodata' s agreements with both Pratt 
and Hartle contained covenants not to compete. McCoy further 
4At the time, Christensen recorded what occurred at this and 
other meetings relating to the Pratt/Hartle problems in which he 
participated. (T. 211-12. ) These notes were admitted in evidence 
at trial as Exhibit 4 and, as already noted, are appended to this 
brief as Addendum 3. 
-8-
g \wpl\132\OOOOOxsb W51 
indicated that UDOT may have contracted with Pratt and Hartle 
before their non-compete obligations to Prodata had expired. 
McCoy "emphasized that it was not the intent of [Prodata] to 
legally or formally involve [UDOT] in this issue.M (T. 144-46; 
Addendum 3 at p. 1.) Worrall agreed to review the documentation 
relative to the UDOT contracts with Pratt, Hartle and Prodata in 
order to advise Christensen of UDOT' s position. (T. 357-59. ) 
(This was the defendants' only contact with those at UDOT who 
participated in the decision to conditionally discharge Pratt 
and Hartle on the subject of Pratt before the decision to 
discharge was made. [Addendum 3. ]) 
D. UDOT s Decision 
Worrall prepared a two-page memorandum discussing the 
Pratt and Hartle contracts with UDOT. 5 This memorandum was 
presented to UDOT Director Eugene H. Findlay at a meeting held 
on September 29, 1989 and attended by Worrall, Findlay, and 
Christensen. (T. 358-60.) Among other things, the memorandum 
stated that the procedures followed by UDOT in selecting, 
contracting with, and paying Pratt "invalidate[d] the 
competitive procurement and violated procurement practices in 
the State of Utah." (Pratt' s UDOT contract ran only from April 
27, 1989 through June 30, 1989 while he had worked and been paid 
for a period from February 27, 1989 through August 31, 1989.) 
(Addendum 2 at p. 2. ) 
5The memorandum was admitted at trial as Exhibit 6 and, as 
previously noted, is appended hereto as Addendum 2. (T. 360. ) 
-9-
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Following his discussions with Christensen and 
Worrall, Findlay concluded that Pratt and Hartle should be 
discharged until the two gentlemen had resolved any differences 
they might have with Prodata arising from violation of their 
covenants not to compete. (Addendum 3 at pp. 3 and 4; T. 93-98, 
220-22. ) Findlay took full responsibility for the decision. 
(T. 110. ) Findlay never met with McCoy or Pratt before making 
the decision. (T. 92-93, -110. ) Christensen was charged with 
obtaining approval of the proposed discharges from the Attorney 
General' s office. To that end, he spoke that same day with Lee 
Ford ("Ford") of the Attorney General's office. Ford agreed 
that UDOT could proceed in the manner proposed by Findlay. 
(Addendum 3 at p. 4; T. 224-25, 299-301. ) 
On September 29, 1989, Christensen spoke for a second 
time with McCoy. (T. 225-29.) Christensen did not advise McCoy 
of the decision made by Findlay. (T. 148-50.) Nor did 
Christensen and McCoy discuss how Pratt and Hartle should be 
treated. (T.221.) Rather, Christensen sought and obtained from 
McCoy additional facts regarding Prodata's contractual relations 
with Hartle and Pratt. (Addendum 3 at pp. 5-6; T. 225-29.) 
E. Aftermath 
On October 2, 1989, Christensen advised Pratt, Hartle 
and Prodata of its decision to discharge them. (T. 2-4, 88. ) 
Pratt and Hartle were assured that they could return to work 
once they had resolved their differences with Prodata regarding 
the covenants not to compete. (T. 3. ) 
-10-
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Hartle promptly reached a compromise with Prodata and 
returned to work. (T. 290-92.) Pratt, although acknowledging 
that he had worked for two months in violation of the covenant 
not to compete, declined to negotiate even the slightest 
compromise. (T. 58, 64-65.) As a consequence, he never 
returned to work at UDOT. Instead, he brought this legal action 
against Prodata. (T. 65-66, 68. ) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Truthful Information 
Pratt bases his claims of intentional interference 
exclusively on McCoy' s transmission of information to UDOT. The 
jury found that McCoy spoke truthfully in suggesting to UDOT 
that Pratt may have breached his covenant not to compete. The 
communication of truthful information, as a matter of law, 
cannot be the basis for a claim of intentional interference with 
economic relations. 
2. Improper Purpose 
The only evidence at trial of McCoy' s state of mind 
was circumstantial. That evidence established that McCoy 
proceeded with the consistent purpose to enforce the covenant 
not to compete for the economic benefit of Prodata. The 
evidence at trial was not sufficient to support an inference 
that McCoy and Prodata acted with a predominant purpose to 
inflict injury on Pratt for the sake of injury alone. 
-11-
3. Proximate Cause 
The evidence did not suffice to support a finding of 
proximate cause. By his own admission, Pratt refused to 
negotiate a settlement with Prodata that would allow him to 
return to work at UDOT. As a matter of common sense and public 
policy, Pratt was the sole legal cause of his damages. 
4. Privilege 
The covenant not to compete was valid and enforceable. 
Prodata and McCoy acted in good faith in asserting their rights 
under that covenant. The evidence at trial did not suffice to 
establish that the defendants lacked the requisite "honesty in 
fact." 
5. Avoidable Consequences 
Pratt rejected any compromise of his differences with 
Prodata based on an erroneous understanding of the 
enforceability of the covenant not to compete. By his own 
admission, he did so with full awareness of the consequences. 
The evidence at trial did not suffice to place the burden of 
Pratt' s miscalculation on Prodata and McCoy. 
6. Liquidated Damages 
Pratt offered no evidence to establish either that 
Prodata suffered no damages as the result of his breach of the 
covenant not to compete or that the liquidated damages set forth 
in the covenant bore no reasonable relationship to contemplated 
compensatory damages. Prodata should prevail on its 
Counterclaim. 
-12-
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ARGUMENT 
I. A JUDGMENT FOR INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS CANNOT BE BASED ON THE TRANSMISSION OF 
TRUTHFUL INFORMATION. 
The only act of interference alleged in the Complaint 
or proven at trial was McCoy's September 28, 1989 statement to 
UDOT that Pratt was bound by, and might have violated, a 
covenant not to compete. In Question 3(a) of the Special 
Verdict, the jury found that the defendants did not "make a 
false statement about a presently existing fact" to UDOT. 6 In 
other words, the information transmitted by McCoy on which Pratt 
rested his claim was truthful. In light of this finding, the 
trial court should have entered judgment in favor of the 
defendants on Pratt' s claim of intentional interference with 
economic relations. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 772(a) (1979) states 
the following black letter rule: 
One who intentionally causes a third person not to 
perform a contract or not to enter into a prospective 
contractual relation with another does not interfere 
improperly with the other' s contractual relation, by 
giving the third person . . . trytftfyl j.nfprmfttign. . 
(Emphasis added.) 
Comment 6 to Section 772 states: "There is of course no 
liability for interference with a contract or with a prospective 
6The trial court had earlier found that the covenant not to 
compete, the principal subject matter of McCoy's contact with 
UDOT, was valid, enforceable and had not been modified or 
superseded. (Addendum 4 and 8. ) 
-13-
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contractual relation on the part of one who merely gives 
truthful information. " See also Allen v. Safewav Stores, Inc. , 
699 P. 2d 277, 280 (Wyo. 1985) (state employee's truthful report 
of other employee's bad attitude not actionable). 
In Prazma v. Kaehne. 768 P. 2d 586 (Wyo. 1989), the 
court held that the plaintiffs had no perscriptive easement, 
then determined that the plaintiffs' claim of interference based 
on the defendants' representation to a third party that such an 
easement did not exist must fail as a matter of law. The court 
stated: "[W]hether solicited or volunteered, truthful 
statements are not actionable for tortious interference with a 
contract or prospective contractual relationship. ,f 768 P. 2d at 
590. &££ glgp Fcmr Nipes gplfl, Inp. vt 71 CPhStryctiPn, Inc., 
809 P. 2d 236 (Wyo. 1991) (under Restatement (Second! § 772(a), 
subcontractor's truthful disclosure of a bid mistake could not 
constitute improper interference with the relationship between 
general contractor and owner). All Prodata and McCoy ever did 
was tell UDOT the truth about Pratt' s breach of the covenant not 
to compete and the deficiencies in UDOT' s handling of Pratt' s 
contract. Such statements, being truthful, are not actionable. 
In Liebe v. Citv Financial Co. . 98 Wis. 2d 10, 295 
N. W. 2d 16 (Wis. App. 1980), the trial court granted judgment 
notwithstanding a jury verdict awarding compensatory and 
punitive damages to a plaintiff in an action for intentional 
interference with contract. The defendants had truthfully 
disclosed to the plaintiff's finance company employer his 
-14-
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connection to a book criticizing the cost of finance company 
loans. In sustaining the trial court's granting of judgment 
notwithstanding verdict, the appellate court concluded: 
We hold that the transmission of truthful 
information is privileged, does not constitute 
improper interference with a contract, and cannot 
subject one to liability for tortious interference 
with a contract. 
295 N. W. 2d at 18. 
In this action, the jury found the essential factual 
predicate for application of the rule set forth in Restatement 
(Second) § 772(a), the Wyoming precedents, and Liebe, supra. 
There is profound incongruity in the present status of this 
action wherein Prodata, having a valid covenant not to compete 
subject to no defenses, and McCoy, having spoken truthfully to 
UDOT, are nonetheless deemed liable to Pratt for intentional 
interference. Such a result is contrary to law and the judgment 
based on the jury's verdict should be set aside. 
II. THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A 
FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANTS ACTED WITH AN "IMPROPER 
PURPOSE, " 
The case of Leioh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 
657 P. 2d 293 (Utah 1982) sets forth the elements of the tort of 
intentional interference with economic relations as follows: 
(1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with 
the plaintiff s existing or potential economic 
relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper 
means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff. 
657 P. 2d at 304. 
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As to the second element, the jury found that Prodata 
and McCoy did not employ "improper means." However, the jury 
did find that the defendants acted with an "improper purpose." 
As defined in Leiah Furniture (and in Jury Instruction No. 18 at 
trial [R. 725, appended hereto as Addendum 6]), proof of an 
"improper purpose" has two components: (1) proof of an intent 
to injure Pratt as "an end in itself" or "for the sake of injury 
alone," and (2) proof that this intent "predominated" over all 
other legitimate motives. 657 P. 2d at 307-08. "[O]bjectional 
short-run purposes . . . eclipsed by legitimate long-range 
economic motivation" will not suffice as proof of an "improper 
purpose. " 657 P. 2d at 307. 
A. Evidence of the Defendants' Intent 
This Court has held: 
To mount a successful attack on the trial court's 
findings of fact, an appellant must marshal all the 
evidence in support of the trial court' s findings and 
then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light 
most favorable to the court below, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings. 
Scharf v. BMG Corn. , 
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985) 
See also Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange. P.2d , 164 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 7 (Utah, June 28, 1991). The only witnesses 
to McCoy's contact with UDOT who testified at trial were McCoy 
himself, and UDOT officials Christensen and Worrall. (McCoy 
never met with Findlay, the person who made the decision to 
discharge Pratt. ) None of these witnesses offered direct 
evidence that the defendants acted with an improper purpose. 
-16-
g: \wpl\132\00000xsb.W51 
Further, the facts provided by these witnesses, all of which 
were undisputed, do not provide any circumstantial evidence of 
an improper purpose (nor has Pratt ever argued that they do. ) 7 
For evidence that might support an inference of 
improper purpose, Pratt must look to the testimony of six former 
Prodata employees: Pratt, Christopher Crocker, Roger Clawson, 
Glen Read, Charles Christensen, and Ronald Hartle. 
1. John P. Pratt—Pratt gave no testimony that would 
support an inference of improper purpose. (T. 87-88.) His only 
post-February, 1989 contact with McCoy came on October 5, 1989 
after Pratt was discharged. Pratt has never contended that 
McCoy' s conduct at that meeting—in which McCoy offered Pratt a 
basis for compromise and Pratt rejected it—is evidence of an 
improper purpose. 
2, Christopher Crocker—Crocker offered the 
following testimony that might be deemed to bear on McCoy' s 
state of mind (this testimony is reproduced in Addendum 9): 
The statement I received from Mr. McCoy was that 
I was to stay away from John Pratt and another 
gentleman that happened to be out there [at 
UDOT], Ron Hartle. 
* * * 
I asked who the gentlemen were. It was indicated 
to me that they were people that prior to that 
point had been referred to namelessly either in 
7The other UDOT employees called a trial —Findlay, Ford, 
Lorin Sheffield, Sharon Holland and Alan McEwan—testified either 
as to their role in making the decision to discharge Pratt or 
their knowledge of facts relating to Pratt' s alleged damages. 
Thus, they provided no evidence of McCoy' s intent. 
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other casual conversations at our monthly 
luncheons or, you know, kicked around the office. 
. . . I knew they were referred to previously 
because everyone was basically informed that two 
contractors had taken contracts away from Pro-
Star and their names were not mentioned, and I 
don' t know why I wasn' t privy to that until I was 
to go to UDOT. Then it became imperative that I 
knew who they were so that I could stay away from 
them. . . . It wasn' t explicit [why I should 
stay away]. Basically every contractor that goes 
to work for Pro-Star signs a no compete clause. 
Being informed that John Pratt and Ron Hartle had 
taken contracts away from Pro-Star means they 
violated, you know, that compete clause, so to 
me, it was clear that you stay away from them 
because they had violated their contractual 
agreements. 
* * * 
[In October, 198 9,] I saw John Pratt and, to the 
best of my knowledge, Ron Hartle go into Will 
McCoy' s office and the doors were shut. Some 
discussion went on that I have no knowledge of. 
* * * 
After the meeting, Mr. McCoy came out and 
basically addressed the individuals that were 
present, indicating that Mr. Pratt was going to 
give up his contract at UDOT and pay some form of 
restitution. . . . In my opinion, [when McCoy 
came out of the meeting] he was quite pleased. 
He was smiling, laughing, seemed to be in good 
spirits. 
* • * 
Not knowing at the time who John Pratt was and 
not having his name mentioned, a statement at a 
luncheon by Mr. McCoy and also backed up by Mr. 
Basham was that contractors had taken contracts, 
consequently, money away from Pro-Star, that they 
had violated their no compete clause and Pro-Star 
intended to make an example of them. 
* * * 
The only other statement that I remember being 
made was a statement that UDOT was a Pro-Star 
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client and was going to remain a Pro-Star client, 
and therefore by going into Pro-Star [sic] on 
their own, John Pratt and Ron Hartle had opened 
themselves up to a lawsuit and would basically 
have to get out. 
(T. 116-117, 119-20, and 122-23. ) 
Crocker consistently placed McCoy' s statements in the 
context of the covenant not to compete: 
Q. Okay, and you understood all along and throughout 
this thing what was motivating those statements 
was the fact that somebody at Pro-Star believed 
there had been a violation of some noncompetition 
clauses, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And throughout the time as you observed those 
individuals who were making these statements, Mr. 
McCoy specifically, it was clear that he 
sincerely believed that that was the case. 
A. That' s my belief. 
(T. 125. ) 
3. Roger L. Clawson--Clawson gave the following 
testimony about a conversation he had with McCoy in February or 
March, 1989, six months before McCoy's September 28, 1989 
contact with UDOT: 
[T]he subject of John Pratt came up and the gist 
of the conversation was that Will was unhappy 
with John Pratt' s conduct of terminating his 
contract and going to work directly for a client. 
He felt -- his comments were the frame that it 
was unethical and he was quite unhappy with John. 
(T. 194 appended hereto as Addendum 10. ) 
4, Glen B. Read—Read gave the following testimony 
that might be viewed as bearing on McCoy' s state of mind: 
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Q. (By Mr. Broadbent) Did you later have any other 
conversations with Will McCoy in which John Pratt 
was mentioned? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. When was the next conversation that you remember 
having with him? 
A. I believe it was on May 3rd, 1989. 
Q. And what did Mr. McCoy say on that occasion about 
John Pratt? 
A. He was telling me that he believed that I should 
not have any dealings with Mr. Pratt because he 
believed that he was a bad influence on me. 
Q. Did he say anything else? 
A. He said that he had done several things that were 
professional unethical and that he—he said that 
he could not elaborate, but he said that he had 
done things that were far worse than anything I 
knew about. 
Q. Did you know about anything unethical that Mr. 
Pratt had done? 
A. The only thing that I had known about that could 
even be construed in my mind as touching upon a 
lack of ethics was his transition from being a 
Pro-Star employee to a subcontractor. 
Q. There was something about that that you thought 
was i nappropri ate ? 
A. I thought that it was. 
* * * 
A. I believe that the client had some pressure put 
upon them to act according to John' s wishes 
because he was in charge of the project and they 
couldn' t afford to lose him. • . . 
Q. And your understanding was that if he would have 
walked away back when he had the employment 
agreement and done what — and as he threatened 
to do, that would have created a severe problem 
for Pro-Star in terms of staffing and making the 
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client happy in that particular situation; isn' t 
that correct? 
A. It' s conceivable/ yes. 
Q. And so the unethical thing you thought perhaps 
was there was something a bit coercive in terms 
of his seeking a subcontract where he was such an 
essential part of the operation and things were 
sort of in the middle of getting done; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
(T. 202-04 appended hereto as Addendum 11.) 
5. Charles ChriBtensen—Charles Christensen 
testified as follows regarding McCoy's statements after McCoy's 
second meeting with UDOT' s Neal Christensen (these excerpts are 
appended to this brief as Addendum 12. ): 
To the best of my recollection, it was stated 
that Mr. Pratt and another gentleman had broken 
their contracts, which is a no-competition 
contract with Pro-Star, and had sought contracts 
on their own behalf, and that Pro-Star couldn' t 
afford to let that happen and that's the reason 
they signed a no-competition agreement with their 
employees, and that they really didn' t want that 
to happen and be part of the business and they 
had to make some kind of a statement to the rest 
of the business world. . . . 
He just said that UDOT was in an uncomfortable 
position but were willing to work it out in a 
businesslike fashion. 
(T. 274-75. ) 
Charles Christensen also remembered: 
• , . There was more discussion at a later time 
towards September on kind of like a case study on 
the whole thing, and our information was that Mr. 
Pratt had broken his agreement with Pro-Star. . . 
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Nothing was really said derogatory about Mr. 
Pratt the whole time. It's just business 
practice. 
(T. 276-77. ) 
6. Ronald J. Hartle--Hartle testified that, after 
April, 1989, he never spoke again with McCoy about Pratt. (T. 
284; all Hartle testimony is appended hereto as Addendum 13. ) 
Hartle also stated that, when his own breach of the covenant not 
to compete became known to-Prodata: "I talked to Bill Basham 
who is the owner of Pro-Star/Prodata and at that time he 
indicated that he would take whatever means he could to get me 
out of UDOT. •• (T. 286. ) 
B. Pratt' s Evidence of McCoy' s State of Mind Was Not 
Sufficient to Prove Improper Purpose, 
Pratt failed to offer sufficient evidence that McCoy 
acted with a predominant purpose to injure Pratt for the sake of 
injury alone. Each of Pratt's witnesses recognized that McCoy 
acted for business rather than personal reasons. For instance, 
Crocker placed all that he heard and observed in the context of 
McCoy's sincere (and correct) belief that Pratt had violated his 
covenant not to compete. Likewise, Clawson, Read and Charles 
Christensen acknowledged that McCoy's "unhappiness" with Pratt 
arose out of economic factors rather than out of some personal 
animosity. Nothing reported by these witness would support an 
inference that McCoy acted out of an overriding desire to hurt 
Pratt. This Court has observed: 
In the rough and tumble of the marketplace, 
competitors inevitably damage one another in the 
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struggle for personal advantage. The law offers no 
remedy for those damages--even if intentional—because 
they are an inevitable byproduct of competition. 
657 P. 2d at 307. 
As Charles Christensen aptly observed regarding McCoy' s conduct: 
"It's just business practice." (T. 277.) 
With respect to discerning a person' s state of mind, 
this Court in Leiah Furniture wisely cautioned: 
Problems inherent in proving motivation or purpose 
make it prudent for commercial conduct to be regulated 
for the most part by the improper means alternative, 
which typically requires only a showing of particular 
conduct. 
657 P.2d at 307 
(footnote omitted). 
Thus, in Leiah Furniture, this Court rejected "improper purpose" 
as the basis for sustaining a jury verdict despite evidence of 
four years of repeated and blatant acts of harassment. £f. , 
Sampson v. Richins, 770 P. 2d 998, 1003-04 (Utah App. 1989) 
(court declined to address issue of "improper purpose" citing 
the cautionary language of Leiah Furniture). The wisdom of this 
caution is manifest in the jury's handling of the evidence in 
this action. The single September 28, 1989 meeting, benign to 
all appearances, has become the basis for a judgment that 
Prodata acted with a predominant intent to hurt Pratt. 
The broader evidentiary concerns in intentional 
interference cases were discussed by the Iowa Supreme Court in 
Harsha v. State Savings Bank, 346 N. W. 2d 791 (Iowa 1984): 
Circumstantial and direct evidence are equally 
probative, State v. O' Connell. 275 N. W. 2d 197, 205 
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(Iowa 1979), but the substantial evidence rule 
requires that the circumstances have "sufficient 
probative force to constitute the basis for a legal 
inference, and not for mere speculation. . . . " 32A 
C. J. S. Evidence § 1039, pp. 753-54 (1964); see also 
30 Am. Jur.2d Evidence § 1091, at 251 (1967) 
("Circumstantial evidence must do more than raise a 
suspicion; it must amount to proof. It is necessary 
that there be some reasonable connection between the 
facts proved and the fact at issue."). Circumstances 
are not sufficient when the conclusion in question is 
based on surmise, speculation, or conjecture. 
346 N. W. 2d at 800. 
Applying the Lei ah Furniture articulation of the law of 
intentional interference with economic relations, the Harsha 
court reversed a jury verdict awarding the plaintiffs damages 
for intentional interference with economic relations. 
The court could find no evidence of impropriety in the facts 
presented to the jury. 
The jury' s finding in this action rises to nothing 
more than a "surmise." There exists no "reasonable connection" 
between McCoy' s behavior as observed by the witnesses and the 
conclusion that he acted first and foremost to hurt Pratt as an 
end in itself. The verdict exemplifies the "[pjroblems inherent 
in proving motivation or purpose" and should be set aside. 657 
P. 2d at 307. 
The two principal cases cited in Leiah Furniture 
underscore the insufficiency of the evidence in the record 
before this Court to support a finding of improper purpose. Top 
Service Body Shop. Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co. , 283 Ore. 201, 
582 P. 2d 1365 (1978) was the source of this Court's analysis in 
-24-
g \wp f\132\0C000xsb W51 
Leiah Furniture. In Top Service, the plaintiff presented 
evidence to the jury of (a) a preexisting dispute between the 
plaintiff and the defendants, (b) the defendant "actively 
discourag[ing]" its insureds from patronizing the plaintiff, (c) 
specific remarks by the defendant "disparaging" the plaintiff's 
services and (d) steps taken by the defendant to prevent its 
insureds who wished to do so from using the plaintiff s 
services. 582 P. 2d at 1372. Although there was no direct 
evidence of a motive to hurt, the jury found this circumstantial 
evidence sufficient to infer an "improper purpose." 
Thereafter, the trial court granted the defendant' s 
motion for judgment n.o.v. ruling that, despite the evidence 
cited above, the record could not support an inference of 
"improper purpose." On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial court' s ruling: 
[W]e agree with the trial court that these acts were 
wholly consistent with [the defendant's] pursuit of 
its own business purposes as it saw them and did not 
suffice to support an inference of the alleged 
improper purpose to injury [the plaintiff]. 
582 P. 2d at 1372. 
The court held that the record contained no direct evidence of 
intent to hurt the plaintiff and that evidence of the 
defendant's conduct would "not support an inference that [the 
defendant] had any design or purpose to inflict injury on [the 
plaintiff] as such. . . . " 582 P. 2d at 1372. Similarly, all 
the evidence at trial showed was Prodata and McCoy pursuing 
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business purposes, i.e.. enforcement of the covenant not to 
compete and the maintenance of good relations with UDOT. 
The second case, Alveska Pipeline Service Co, v, 
Aurora Air Service. Inc. . 604 P. 2d 1090 (Alaska 1979), was 
singled out by this Court in Leiah Furniture as setting forth 
facts supporting a finding of improper purpose; yet, it affords 
Pratt no comfort. In Alveska, the plaintiff initially brought 
suit against the defendant to resolve a payment dispute. After 
paying the amount in dispute, the defendant exercised its 
separate and unrelated contractual right to replace the 
plaintiff as air carrier for a third party. The plaintiff was 
then terminated by the third party and proceeded to bring an 
action for intentional interference with contract alleging 
improper purpose, i.e., retribution for the plaintiffs' prior 
legal action. 
The Alyeska court stated: 
In the case at bar, the central factual issue, as to 
which there was evidentiary conflict, was whether [the 
defendant] was genuinely furthering its own economic 
and safety interests or was using them as a facade for 
inflicting iniurv upon fthe plaintiff!. 
604 P. 2d at 1094 (emphasis added). 
The Alveska court found the evidence sufficient to support a 
finding that the defendant had exercised its third-party 
contractual right to settle scores on the entirely unrelated 
payment dispute. In contrast, Pratt' s breach of his covenant 
not to compete was at the center of both Prodata's problems with 
Pratt and the act of interference—the contact with UDOT. In 
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all the evidence offered by Pratt, there is not the slightest 
suggestion that Prodata used the covenant not to compete as a 
"facade for inflicting injury. . . . •• To the contrary, the 
covenant not to compete was a vital part of Prodata' s 
relationship with its employees and clients. McCoy' s actions 
were nothing more than a consistent effort to protect Prodata' s 
goodwill and business interests. 
More recently, in United Truck Leasing Corp. v. 
Geltman, 406 Mass. 811, 551 N.E.2d 20 (1990), the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court adopted this Court' s reasoning in Leiah 
Furniture. In United Truck, the plaintiff alleged that, because 
the plaintiff had failed to give the defendant leads for new 
business, the defendant had interfered with both existing and 
prospective contractsof the plaintiff. Affirming a directed 
verdict for the defendant, the court held that the defendant's 
"apparent motives were to benefit his customers and himself 
financially. There is not enough evidence to warrant a finding 
that his real motive in these matters was to hurt [the 
plaintiff]." 551 N. E. 2d at 24. 
Viewed in the light most favorable to Pratt, the 
record in this action does not support an inference that McCoy 
acted with a predominant purpose to hurt Pratt. First, none of 
the evidence indicates that McCoy entertained any ill will 
towards Pratt. It is a major leap from '•unhappiness" to malice. 
Pratt' s breach of the covenant not to compete was the sole 
source of any disagreement and unhappiness. McCoy felt that 
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Pratt had acted unethically specifically because Pratt "had gone 
to work directly for a client" and had disregarded his covenant 
not to compete. (T. 194. ) Such displeasure was clearly 
motivated by McCoy's and Prodata's economic interests. Each of 
Pratt' s witnesses recognized that business considerations, 
rather than personal animus, underlay McCoy's words and actions. 
The requisite motive must be to inflict injury as "an end in 
itself. " 657 P.2d at 308. There was no showing that this was 
ever McCoy' s motive. 
Second, even assuming the evidence at trial would 
support an inference that McCoy acted in some measure to inflict 
injury for the sake of injury, the evidence is not sufficient to 
show that such a motive "predominated." McCoy's chief motive, 
even in the eyes of Prodata' s former employees, was to further 
Prodata' s economic interests by enforcing the covenant not to 
compete. In this, he was like the defendant in United Truck--
primarily seeking to benefit Prodata financially. Further, this 
is not a case like Alyeska where exercise of a contractual right 
was •' a facade for inflicting injury. . . . " 604 P. 2d at 1094. 
The Alveska defendant had a grudge arising from one transaction 
and, based on that grudge, took arbitrary action in a separate 
transaction that had only superficial economic justification. 
There is nothing in the record to suggest that McCoy' s contact 
with UDOT regarding Pratt as part of his response to Pratt's 
breach was nothing more than "a facade for inflicting injury 
upon" Pratt. In sum, it must be concluded that the finding of 
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"improper purpose" was based only on "surmise, speculation, or 
conjecture." 346 N. W. 2d at 800. 
III. THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE JURY' S FINDING THAT THE ACTIONS OF PRODATA AND 
MCCOY WERE THE APPROXIMATE CAUSE OF PRATT' B INJURY. 
This Court has stated with respect to proximate cause: 
Proximate cause is a legal construct calling for a 
legal conclusion based on various factors in addition 
to an actual cause-effect relationship. It is common 
place in the law that an act, omission, or force may 
be an actual cause, but not a proximate cause. 
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 
701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1985). 
The defendants do not dispute the factual finding that there 
existed a cause-effect or "but for" causal relationship between 
their words and Pratt' s discharge. However, proximate cause is 
more than cause and effect. The legal analysis of proximate 
cause is driven by "considerations of common sense and public 
policy." McKelliDS v. Saint Francis Hospital, Inc. , 741 P. 2d 
467, 470 (Okl. 1987). 
A. The Evidence 
The evidence showed the following regarding the 
proximate cause of Pratt' s injury: 
1. At trial, Pratt sought and obtained recovery for 
damages from October 2, 1989 through the conclusion of certain 
work at UDOT. (R. 2-13. ) 
2. UDOT' s discharge of Pratt and Hartle was not 
absolute. Pratt could return to work once he had settled his 
differences with Prodata. Pratt testified: 
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Q. And when you were advised you were terminated, it 
wasn't, "Mr. Pratt, you're out of here and never 
come back," it was, ,fMr. Pratt, you're out of 
here, but if you can resolve things with Prodata, 
you' re welcome to come back. " 
A. Yes. 
Q. Those were the terms. It wasn't just cutting you 
loose; isn' t that correct? 
A. That' s correct. 
(T. 88. ) 
3. Hartle settled his differences with Prodata and 
returned to work at UDOT. (T. 290-92. ) 
4. Pratt knew that he had violated the covenant not 
to compete, but he believed erroneously that the covenant was 
unenforceable. 
On this point, Pratt testified: 
Q. And so assuming that the jury or the law doesn't 
agree with your perception that these contracts 
superseded each other, you would have had an 
existing obligation not to compete through the 
end of April of 1989; isn't that true? 
A. That' s right. 
Q. And when you went to work for UDOT, you at least 
recognized the potential that those two months 
might fall under the noncompetition provision 
that was included in your employment agreement, 
didn' t you? 
A. I didn' t consider that to be a factor at all. 
Q. You hadn' t discussed that? 
A, That agreement had been superseded. 
(T. 58. ) 
5. Based on this erroneous belief, Pratt rejected 
all offers by Prodata to settle their differences and, as of 
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October 5, 1989, took the position that he would not pay a penny 
to resolve the issue of his violation of the covenant not to 
compete. 
Pratt' s testimony on this point was as follows: 
Q. And did you direct your attorney to speak with 
me? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And did your attorney advise you of anything that 
had been said in conversations between him and 
me? 
A. Nothing other than your initial position that I 
needed to pay money in order to get back to UDOT. 
Q. So you were told that a dollar offer of 
settlement had been made on behalf of Pro-Star, 
right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you were fundamentally opposed to paying a 
penny? 
A. Absolutely, absolutely. 
Q. And you' d rather be in this litigation than pay a 
penny; is that right? 
A. I would rather have had Pro-Star act responsibly 
and let me get on equal economic footing before 
we discussed any problem they had with me. I 
would rather they had come to me directly, yes. 
Q. But the fact is, you would rather be in 
litigation than pay a penny to Pro-Star. 
A. I would not pay money to someone who had caused 
me damage in order to extort that money from me, 
in my words. 
Q. That' s not the question. 
A. Rather than do that, yes, I would rather be here. 
* * * 
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Q. But when the topic came up, they told you how the 
problem could be solved, didn' t they? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was to pay around $4,000, right? 
A. Yes, they did. 
Q. And you never made a counter offer so nobody even 
negotiated the matter, did they? 
A. No, we did not negotiate the matter, no. 
* * * 
Q. And in fact, after that moment in time, you never 
had any more discussions and to your knowledge, 
the attorneys had no more discussions about the 
possibility of resolving this matter short of 
litigation; is that right? 
A. That7 s correct. 
Q. And you recognized at that time that the 
consequence of not resolving the matter was you 
would not get back the work at UDOT unless you 
could persuade Mr. Christensen to the contrary. 
A. That' s right. 
Q. Okay, and you knew that not going back to work at 
UDOT might result in your being deprived, in your 
own testimony, deprived of contracts exceeding 
$84,000; isn't that correct? 
A. I had no knowledge of any figures at that time. 
Q. But you recognize that there was some --
A. I recognized that there was some dollars 
involved. 
Q. Tens of thousands of dollars? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you also knew, did you not, that Mr. Hartle, 
in fact, did make a settlement with Pro-Star and 
he went back and worked at UDOT; is that correct? 
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A. That' s correct. 
(T. 64-68; all Pratt testimony cited is 
appended hereto as Addendum 14. ) 
6. Only after Pratt made the conscious decision to 
abandon any effort to settle with Prodata and UDOT; s conditional 
discharge become final did Pratt suffer the damages awarded at 
trial. 
B. The Evidence Was Not Legally Sufficient on The 
Issue of Proximate Cause, 
The issue presented is actually more legal in nature 
than factual. This Court must determine whether common sense 
and public policy support the jury' s finding that the acts of 
the defendants were the proximate cause of Pratt' s losses. Well 
before Pratt had suffered any appreciable injury, Prodata made a 
reasonable offer of settlement ($4,000 v. $25,000 liquidated 
damages). Pratt not only declined the offer but refused to 
counter the offer. This refusal was based on the misinformed 
notion that he was not bound by the covenant not to compete. In 
contrast, Hartle reached a compromise with Prodata and returned 
to work. 
This Court has long articulated a policy in favor of 
settlement and compromise. See, e. a. , Alvin G. Rhoades Pump 
Sales v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 681 P.2d 1244, 1248 
(Utah 1984). Prodata made a good faith attempt to reach a 
compromise with Pratt. Hartle' s experience shows that Prodata 
was in earnest. Pratt' s own misevaluation of his legal position 
led him to terminate all meaningful discussion of settlement and 
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instead to seek redress in this legal action. Such a course 
offends both common sense and public policy. Pratt caused his 
own losses. To lay blame for Pratt's losses, as a matter of 
law, on Prodata and McCoy when Pratt made the conscious decision 
not to compromise rewards intransigence and promotes litigation 
as a means of dispute resolution over negotiation and 
settlement. Pratt was the sole legal cause of his losses and 
should bear responsibility for those losses. 
IV. THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A 
JURY FINDING THAT PRODATA AND McCOY FAILED TO ACT IN 
GOOD FAITH. AND. THEREFORE. WITHOUT PRIVILEGE. 
The trial court correctly instructed the jury that 
Prodata and McCoy were entitled "to assert and protect their 
economic and legal rights" provided they "proceed in good 
faith." The sole measure of that good faith was whether 
Prodata and McCoy "entertained an honest belief" that Pratt had 
breached the covenant not to compete. (R. 733 [Jury Instruction 
No. 25) appended hereto as Addendum 7. ) 
The evidence set forth at pages 16 through 21 above 
with respect to improper purpose also constitutes the evidence 
that bears on the issue of privilege. Also of consequence in 
evaluating the jury's verdict is the trial court's finding by 
directed verdict that the covenant not to compete was valid and 
enforceable. (Addendum 4 and 8. ) With this finding, not 
disputed on appeal, the issue of privilege turns on whether the 
evidence was sufficient to show that Prodata and McCoy failed to 
act in good faith. 
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This Court has equated "good faith" with "honesty." 
&££ Suaarhouse Finance Co. v. Zions First National Bank. 21 Utah 
2d 68, 440 P. 2d 869, 870 (Utah 1968). Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-
201(19) defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact in the conduct 
or transaction concerned. " Whatever the definition, the 
evidence at trial allowed for only one conclusion: McCoy was 
honest in stating to UDOT that Pratt had violated the covenant 
not to compete and that UDOT' s handling of Pratt' s contract 
violated procurement practices. Prodata was doing nothing more 
than asserting its rights under the covenant not to compete and 
under the law generally. 
Prodata and McCoy were privileged defendants. Pratt 
had breached his covenant not to compete and Prodata wanted to 
advise UDOT as a party to that breach. The very law of 
intentional interference with economic relations on which Pratt 
relies makes potentially actionable UDOT' s participation in 
Pratt's breach. See, e. a. , Aarimerica, Inc. v. Mathes, 199 111. 
App. 3d 435, 557 N. E. 2d 357, 367 (111. App. 1990). Certainly, 
Findlay was concerned about UDOT' s possible liability for its 
dealings with Pratt and Hartle. (T. 98. ) Public policy favors 
permitting free commercial discourse that encourages early 
identification and resolution of disputes. The result in this 
action would require a party clearly wronged by a former 
employee and arguably wronged by a third party to remain silent 
regarding the wrong or risk legal action. The law imposes no 
such requirement. 
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V. THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL DICTATED A FINDING THAT PRATT 
INTENTIONALLY OR HEEDLESSLY FAILED TO PROTECT HIS OWN 
INTERESTS, 
R e s t a t e m e n t (Second) of T o r t s § 918(a) (1979) 
provides: 
One is not prevented from recovering damages for a 
particular harm resulting from a tort if the 
tortfeasor intended the harm or was aware of it and 
was recklessly disregardful of it, unless the injured 
p^rgpn with Hppwleflge pf th? flfrPqgr pf the frgirm 
intentionally pr fre?fliegs3-y fgiilefl to protect fris pwn 
interests-
(Emphasis added.) 
Comment to Section 918 at page 502 provides the following 
example that bears striking resemblance to the undisputed facts 
of this case: 
A destroys a fence on B' s land, intending for B' s 
cattle to escape. B sees what is happening but in the 
belief that A would be responsible for all harm caused 
by the destruction of the fence, intentionally fails 
to prevent his cattle from escaping as he easily could 
do. B is not entitled to recover damages for harm 
caused to his cattle by their escape. 
Pratt's own testimony set forth at pages 28 through 31 
above establishes the applicability of this legal principle. 
Pratt, like B in the above example, saw what he perceived as a 
wrong to be unfolding, knew how to avoid the harm caused by that 
wrong, but wrongly believing that the covenant not to compete 
was unenforceable, he refused to pursue the compromise that 
would prevent the harm. The evidence at trial requires that 
Pratt be responsible for the loss he caused by refusing to 
resolve his differences with Prodata. The jury' s finding that 
-36-
g \wpl\132\OOOOOxsb W51 
Pratt did not fail intentionally or heedlessly to protect his 
own interests cannot be supported by sufficient evidence. 
IV. PRATT FAILED TO OFFER ANY EVIDENCE THAT PRODATA DID 
NOT SUFFER DAMAGES AS THE RESULT OF HIS BREACH OF THE 
COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE. 
Certain basic propositions relating to the enforcement 
of Pratt's covenant not to compete are now established by the 
trial court's directed verdict, the jury's Special Verdict and 
the undisputed law and evidence: 
a. The covenant not to compete was enforceable and 
was not superseded by a later covenant. 
(Addendum 4 and 8. ) 
b. Prodata did not waive enforcement of the covenant 
not to compete nor did Prodata act so as to 
subject itself to the defense of laches. 
(Addendum 5.) 
c. Pratt worked for UDOT as a competitor of Prodata 
two months before the covenant not to compete 
expired. He worked 227 hours over that two month 
time period and received $10,215 in compensation. 
(T. 59-61. ) 
Pratt had the burden at trial of proving that Prodata 
suffered no damage as the result of his undisputed breach of the 
covenant not to compete. In Young Electric Sign Co. v. United 
Standard West. Inc. , 755 P. 2d 162, 164 (Utah 1988), this Court 
stated: 
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The burden is on the party who would avoid a 
liquidated damages provision to prove that no damages 
were suffered or that there is no reasonable 
relationship between compensatory and liquidated 
damages. 
Pratt failed to meet either of these burdens. Pratt did not 
offer any evidence at trial that would support an inference that 
Prodata suffered no injury as the result of his breach of the 
covenant not to compete. At most, Pratt contended that 
Prodata's out of pocket loss arising from his failure to account 
for the gain he received from the breach was only $2,64 6.70 as 
opposed to $4,199.50. (T. 61, 83.) 
Covenants not to compete have as their purpose to 
protect the employer' s goodwill in an employee who renders 
special, unique, or extraordinary services. See System Concepts 
Inc. v. Dixon. 669 P. 2d 421, 426 (Utah 1983). There was no 
dispute at trial that Pratt' s covenant not to compete fit this 
description and that Pratt was such an employee. (Addendum 8. ) 
Customarily, the covenant would be enforced by 
injunctive relief. See System Concepts, supra, 669 P. 2d at 427-
28. Such enforcement requires a showing of "irreparable harm." 
The court in System Concepts noted: 
[T]he nature of the threatened harm is irreparable, 
inasmuch as the damages that may result from the 
misappropriation of confidential information and 
goodwill "could be estimated only bv conjecture and 
not bv anv accurate standard. " 
669 P. 2d 428 
(footnote omitted and emphasis added). 
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In recognition of the "conjectural" nature of any estimate of 
losses from a breach, Pratt' s Employment Agreement established 
as the enforcement mechanism for the covenant not to compete-
rather than injunctive relief--an award of liquidated damages in 
an agreed amount of $25,000. Yet the interest to be protected 
was the same as in System Concepts--goodwill--and subject to the 
same difficulties of proof identified by this Court in System 
Concepts. 
Damages to goodwill are problematic because they are 
injuries to an intangible and inevitably require some level of 
11
 conjecture" to quantify or even to identify. However, this is 
not to say that such damages are not real. This Court has 
stated with respect to goodwill: 
If there is legal consideration given to support it, 
an employer is equally entitled to the goodwill 
created by his employee, as is the purchaser of an 
establishment which includes the goodwill of the 
business. In both cases, when the individual 
responsible for creating the goodwill and the business 
to which it attaches, become separated, it is 
necessary to preserve that goodwill to the business by 
a covenant on the part of the individual that it will 
not compete in an area where his personal reputation 
will detach the old customers from the old business. 
Align v. Rpse PgtrK PhjirmgiQy 
237 P.2d 823, 827 (Utah 1951) 
It is clear that, in this action as in System 
Concepts, a valued employee, who had generated substantial 
goodwill for his employer at a customer, undertook to use that 
goodwill developed while in the service of the employer in 
competition with, and therefore to the detriment of, the 
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employer. (T. 51, 52, 322. ) Pratt offered no evidence to meet 
his burden to prove that the breach of his covenant not to 
compete caused Prodata no damage to its goodwill. In Regional 
Seles Agency, Ing, v, Reighert, 784 p. 2d 1210 (Utah App. 1989), 
the Utah Court of Appeals upheld a liquidated damages clause as 
the enforcement mechanism for a covenant not to compete. After 
leaving the plaintiff's employ, the defendant had done business 
with three principals of the plaintiff in violation of his 
covenant not to compete. Considering the plaintiff s defense 
that the contract's liquidated damages clause was unenforceable, 
the appellate court examined the evidence and concluded: 
Even if the instruction could be read to put the 
burden on [the defendant] to show no damages were 
suffered or there was no reasonable relationship 
between the actual damages [the plaintiff] suffered 
and the $42,176.09 it would collect under the 
agreement, there was insufficient evidence introduced 
below to enable the iurv to find either proposition. 
784 P.2d at 1214 
(emphasis added). 
Likewise, in the present action, the plaintiff failed to offer 
any evidence that Prodata suffered no damage or, for that 
matter, that there was no reasonable relationship between the 
contemplated damages and the liquidated damages. (Special 
Verdict Question 11. ) In view of this failure of proof, Pratt's 
defense to the Counterclaim must fail and Prodata is entitled to 
recover liquidated damages in the amount of $25,000 as a matter 
of law. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should vacate the judgment in favor of 
Pratt on the First Claim for Relief and the Counterclaim and 
should enter Judgment in favor of the defendants. In the 
alternative, the Court should order a new trial of all issues 
not definitively resolved by the jury. 
DATED this day of August, 1991. 
VAN COTT^. BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Eric C. Olson 
Attorneys for Appellants 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to be mailed, 
postage prepaid this day of August, 1991, to the following: 
Berne S. Broadbent, Esq. 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Tabl 
NON-DISCLOSURE/NCN-COMPETITIVE 
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
In exchange for my becoming employed (or my employment being 
continued) by PRODATA or its subsidiaries, affiliates or successors 
(hereafter referred to collectively as "PRODATA"), I hereby agree a 
follows: 
1. I will perform for PRODATA such duties as may be designated 
by PRODATA from time to time. I will devote my best efforts 
to the interests of PRODATA and will not engage in any 
activities detrimental to the best interests of PRODATA or 
accept other employment, consulting assignments or 
memberships on the Board of Directors or as an officer of 
other companies which would involve any activities directly 
competitive with my employers or which would unduly 
interfere with my work performance during normal business 
hours without the prior written consent of PRODATA during my 
period of employment by PRODATA. 
2. Without further compensation, except as outlined in hiring 
or company software incentive agreements, I hereby agree 
promptly to disclose to PRODATA, and I hereby assign and 
agree to assign to PRODATA, or its designee, my entire 
right, title, and interest in and to all designs, 
trademarks, discoveries, formulae, processes, manufacturing 
or marketing techniques, trade secrets, proprietary 
information, inventions, improvements, ideas, lists or 
copyrightable works, including all rights to obtain, 
register, perfect and enforce these proprietary interests 
(a) which pertain to any line of business activity of 
PRODATA, including without limitation the development or 
manufacture of computer terminals and related computer 
programs and applications, (b) which are aided by the use of 
time, material or facilities of PRODATA, whether or not 
during working hours, or (c) which relate to any of my work 
during the period of my employment with PRODATA whether or 
not during normal working hours. 
3. I agree to perform, during and after my employment, all 
reasonable acts deemed necessary or desirable by PRODATA to 
permit and assist it, at its expense, including execution of 
documents and assistance or cooperation in legal 
proceedings, in obtaining and enforcing the full benefits, 
enjoyment, rights and title throughout the world in the 
items hereby assigned by PRODATA as set forth in paragraph 2 
above• 
I agree to hold in confidence and not directly or indirectly 
to use or dislcose, either during or after termination of my 
employment with PRODATA, for a period of one (1) year, any 
information I obtain during the period of my employment, 
whether or not during working hours, pertaining to any 
aspects of the business of PRODATA which either is 
information not known by actual or potential competitors of 
PRODATA or is proprietary information of PRODATA or its 
customers or suppliers, whether of a technical nature or 
otherwise, except to the extent authorized by PRODATA, until 
such information becomes generally known through no fault of 
my own. I agree not to make copies of such information 
except as authorized by PRODATA. Upon termination of my 
employment or upon an earlier request of PRODATA, I will 
return or deliver to PRODATA all tangible forms of such 
information in my possession or control, including but not 
limited to drawings, specifications, documents, records, 
devices, models or any other material and copies or 
reproductions thereof. 
This Agreement (a) shall survive my employment by PRODATA, 
for a period of one (1) year, (b) does not in any way 
restrict my right or the right of PRODATA to terminate my 
employment, (c) inures to the benefit of successors and 
assigns of PRODATA, and (d) is binding upon my heirs and 
legal representatives. 
This Agreement does not apply to an invention to which its 
application may be prohibited by law. I agree to disclose 
all inventions made by me during the course of my employment 
with PRODATA, in confidence to PRODATA to permit a 
determination as to whether or not the inventions should be 
the property of PRODATA as outlined in the Employees 
Software Incentive Agreement. 
I certify that, to the best of my information and belief, I 
am not a party to any other agreement or under any legal or 
equitable obligation to a previous employer which will 
interfere with my full compliance with this Agreement. I 
represent that I will not use or disclose to PRODATA any 
proprietary information of any former employer in performing 
services for PRODATA. 
I understand that I must maintain confidentiality of all 
software codes, models, programs and documentation as 
confidential and privileged trade secrets owned exclusively 
by PRODATA. I certify that I will not at any time in the 
future use or disclose any proprietary information or trade 
secrets of PRODATA concerning PRODATA software products. I 
understand that this term is not subject to only one year 
after termination but goes on in perpetuity. I also 
understand that this term cannot be violated and then 
remedied by the 525,000 liquidated damages as stated for the 
consulting work in term #9. 
IOCJOOC:.: 
NON-DISCLOSURE/NON-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENT 
Page 3 
I agree that I will not for a period of one (1) year after 
termination of my employment for any reason whatsoever, 
whether directly or indirectly, engage in or accept 
employment from or become affiliated with or connected with 
any business which is directly competitive with PRODATA 
within an area of fifty (50) miles from the city limits of 
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah, either as an 
individual, proprietor, partner, employee, co-venturer, 
agent, officer, director or stockholder, I further agree 
that during that time period not to, directly or indirectly, 
approach, contact, solicit, or call upon any persons, 
parties, or businesses who at the date of termination and 
for a period of one (1) year prior to said termination were 
clients of PRODATA or in any way attempt to divert said 
clients business from PRODATA to any other person, party or 
business. As used in this paragraph, the phrase "any 
business which is directly competitive" should be construed 
to mean any private, profit oriented business of the same or 
similar nature within the geographical area which is 
currently soliciting business and prospective clients that 
would be similar or identical in scope to the clients of 
PRODATA, The phrase does not include government agencies nor 
other employment by an entity in the area which although 
similar in scope, does not solicit or attempt to solicit 
clients of similar scope and nature as the clients of 
PRODATA. 
10, 
If, however, I do violate the terms of this Agreement, I 
agree to pay to employer Twenty Five Thousand Dollars 
($25,000), as liquidated damages for so doing, that sum 
being agreed to as the amount of damages which shall be done 
to the business of PRODATA by said act or acts. Such 
liquidated damages shall be the sole and exclusive remedy 
for breach of this Non-Disclosure/Non-Competitive Agreement. 
I certify and acknowledge that I have carefully read all of 
the provisions of this Agreement and that I understand and 
will fully and faithfully comply with such provisions. 
AlWft^ rtuiJ- fl(r?(W 
PRODATA INC. EMPLOYEE 
3y: .P.(h 
j 
10000;:r; 
Amendment to t h e P r o - S t a r \r n - D i s c l c s u r e / Non-Ccr.ioet l t i v e Agreement 
o f Jonr P. P r a t t 
Cepterncer 16, 1385 
The Drohibitions against wording for or starting a business to cowoet 
with Pro-Star -$d* shall not apply in the event that termination of 
employment is due to: 
(1) Failure of Pro-Star to provide work in the Salt Lake Metropolitan 
Area, 
or 
(2) Failure of Pro-Star to make payment within 7 days of scheduled 
oayday, 
or 
(3) S u b s t a n t i a l m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of pay, b e n e f i t s , or working 
c o n d i t i o n s on t h e par t of P r o - S t a r . 
i (KK).k':", 
Tab 2 
E.H. F i n d l a y , C.P.A. 
Execut ive D i r e c t o r 
Harold W. Worral l , P.E. 
Comptrol ler 
Data P r o c e s s i n g Contracts 
September 23, 1989 
EXHIBIT-
WITXSJ, 
•"7-/2-7 D 
•(*K ^"vW.i. v <Z<~-^ 
RocKKWBna«ronDVNOTARY 
Several Data Processing contracts for consultant services have 
been reviewed. The following is a summary of that review; 
1. Contracts were executed between UDOT and Aspen Consulting 
and Computer Solutions. Aspen Consulting's contract was for 
the period 4/27/89 through 6/30/89 and was valued (according 
to the contract document) at $250,000 total with a limit of 
$50,000 per project. Computer Solutions' contract was for the 
period 4/27/89 through 6/30/89 and was valued (according to 
the contract document) at $25,000 with a limit of $20,000 per 
project. Aspen consulting is owned and operated by Ron 
Hartle. Computer Solutions is owned and operated by John 
Pratt. The contract documents did not specify the type of 
service to be delivered under either contract. 
^ 2 . An existing contrac*. between UDOT and Pro Star was amended 
upward for an additional $72,000 and extended from 1/1/83 
through 9/1/89. This contract was for ISS DP Chargeback work 
(according to back-up contract documentation). 
£, Pro Star employed both Ron Hartle and John Pratt. John 
Pratt terminated his employment with Pro Star at the end of 
March 1989. Ron Hartle terminated his employment with Pro 
Star in Julj3M989. Ron Hartle was awarded the contract 
described previously while he was an employee of Pro Star. 
4. Pro Star invoiced UDOT for services delivered by Ron Hartle 
on 7/7/89 for 225.5 hours 3 $45 per hour. The invoice 
specified that the services were delivered during the period 
5/1/89 - 5/31/89. The total of the invoice was for 
$10,147.50. Pro Star also invoiced UDOT for services 
delivered by Ron Hartle on 7/13/89 for 204 hours ® $45 per 
hour. The invoice specified that the services were delivered 
during the period 6/1/89 - 6/30/89. The total of the invoice 
was for $9,180. 
5. Aspen Consulting (Ron Hartle) invoiced UDOT on 7/25/89 for 
66 hours ® $45 per hour for ''Services rendered on the System 
Analysis and Initial Design for the ISS Data Processing 
Chargeback system". The invoice did not specify the period 
involved, however, it was dated 6/12/89. The total of th<? 
invoice was $2,970. Aspen Consulting also invoiced UDOT zr. 
7/25/89 for 12 hours ® $45 per hour for "Services rendered on 
the period involved, however, the invoice was dated 7/19/89. 
The total of the invoice was $540. Although the billing 
periods were not specified, it is assumed that they cover the 
months of May and June 1989 respectively. The award of the 
contract, subsequent billing documentation, and the 
relationship of Ron Hartle to" Pro Star has placed UDOT in the 
position of contracting with anl employee of a consultant to 
deliver the same general service as the consultant. This may 
have put UDOT in a position of liability to Pro Star. 
6. Computer Solutions (John Pratt) invoiced UDOT on 6/1/89 for 
"Data Processing Consulting - John Pratt MMS Feasibility 
Study" for 227 hours « $45 per hour for the period 2/27/89 
through 4/30/89. This totaled $10,215. The same warrant paid 
another invoice for "Data Processing Consulting - John Pratt 
MMS Feasibility Study k EMS Feasibi1ity" for 170 hours ® $45 
per hour for the period 5/1/89 through 5/31/89. This totaled 
$7,650. John Pratt was employed with Pro Star for a partial 
period during the time encompassed by the invoice dated 
6/1/89. In addition, no contract was in place to pay Computer 
Solutions or John Pratt for services rendered prior to 
4/27/89. Computer Solutions/John Pratt was a bidding vendor 
for a contract awarded through a competitive procurement 
process by UDOT. He was selected to render services under an 
open ended contract as the need arose in UDOT Data processing. 
This selection, subsequent contract, and documented billings 
when viewed together invalidates the competitive procurement 
and violated procurement practices in the State of Utah. 
7. The payments in the previous occurrences were paid and 
recorded in FY89. Both contracts to Aspen Consulting and 
Computer Solutions expired 6/30/89. Computer Solutions has 
billed and received payments since 6/30/89 of $7,155 and 
$5,400. Nfo contract amendment is on file. Aspen Consulting 
has billed and received one payment since 6/30/89 of 
$7 ,942.50. 
8. The contract with Computer Solutions appears to be overrun 
by $12,755 (with a strict interpretation of contract 
documentation present and wording). 
Attached are copies of all invoices, contracts, and supporting 
documentation used in the preparation of this analysis. 
Tab 3 
DP CONTRACT ISSUE 
DATE: ISSUE PERIOD 3EGAN: SE?~. 2]_^> 1989 
ISSUE INVOLVES: PRC-STAR. ASPEN, AND COMPUTER SOLUTIONS 
CONSULTING COMPANIES. 
INDIVIDUALS: WILL MCCOY- PRO__STAR 
(^ONTHARDI P- ASPFND 
JOHN PRATT- COMPUTER SOLUTIONS 
^ 
THE FOLLOWING IS A CONTINUING SUMMARY OF INVOLVEMENT OF MYSELF 
ANO T:-E DEPARTMENT 'SENIOR MANAGEMENT) IN THIS ISSUE. 
EVENTS-FINDINGS: 
UJ e cL 
Septemoer^T^ 1 989: 
I met Harold Worrall and Will Mc Coy in Atrium. Harold asked 
that we meet on Sept. 28, AM to discuss a DP problem which 
Will M. had identified for him. I agreed to meet. 
September 23. 1989: 
I rret with will M. at 3:30 AM en thursday morning. Harold 
was to be with us. He was late in coming. 
Will M. explainea his company has emoloyee/sub contractor 
prcolems with two individuals (John Pratt ana Ron Harclej. 
Because of contracts the Department has in place with both of 
these parties. We are professionally and perhaps legally at 
risk. It appears we may have hired them prior to the 
termination of employee or sub contractor agreements which 
Pro Star believes they legally have in place with both 
parties. These agreements have non-compete clauses. It 
aocears that Ron Hardle (Ascen Consulting) and John Pratt 
(Ccmouter Solutions) were hired and payee for time periods 
by the Department *hicn could be in violation with the 
emoloyee/sub contrator agreements. 
These are allegations raised by Will M. wnich must be 
evaluated and considered by the Department, 
Will M. emphasized that it was not the intent of Pro Star 
to legally or formally involve the Department, in twie ^<-..~ 
aware that Pro Star nas non-compete orovisions in their 
emc*oyee/suo contractor agreements.; 
Harold W, joineo us and *e continued the discussion. 
Following the time with will M., Harold agreed to nave m s 
staff review accrcpriate contracts and oayment invoices to 
precare us for another meeting to review wnere the Department 
aopears to be in this matter, orior to meeting with the 
Director as soon as possible. 
Septemoer 29, 1989: 
Harold W. provided me a memo oreoared by Gary Williams wmch 
provded a history of contracts and invoices related to this 
matter. He stated that, in m s opinion, Gary's findings 
sncu'd be discussed with the Director as soon as oossiole. 
I agreed but asked for some time to review Gary's work with 
DP Staff to be sure of tne facts and issues in Garv's memo. 
DP Staff Meeting: 
I met with Kent Nielsen, Loren Sheffield, and Garn "ollestruo 
at acout 10:00 AM to discuss this matter. I focused on 
reconciling contracts and invoices to contracts. 
(Information provided by Harold W. indicated that the 
relationship termination date with Pro Star for John Pratt 
was March 1989 and this same date for Ron Harcle was ^uly 
1989 ) . 
The caid invoice copies crovioeo py Gary w. indicated that 
the Deoartment had: 
1 Paid John Pratt for time worked beginning 27 February 
1989. 
2 Paid John Pratt for time worked after June 30, 1989 
under a contract with Comouter Solutions which expired 
June 30, 1989. 
3 Paid Ron Hardle for time worked which was for 
a time period orior to July 1989. 
4. naa paid Ron Harcle for time worked after June 30, '989 
under a contract with Aspen Corp. which expired June 
30, 1989. 
5 Extended a contract with Pro Star to 
September 1389. (Funding avaiable under this contract 
may not be adequate to cover orojected work and costs 
for the FY i990 year.) 
"ollowing the invoices ana contracts review I focused :n *no 
ana how the contracts with ^onn Pratt and Ron Harcle were 
initiated and orecared. From that discussion I learnea trie 
following: 
o Loren Shefield and Gam Toiiestruo were the principal 
individuals *nvolved in the negotiation and 
preparation of the contracts. They acKncwledged that 
that they haa discussed Ron Hardle's relationship with 
Pro Star with him at the time they were discussing m s 
contracting with the Deoartment as Aspen. Garn stated 
he understood from that conversation that Ron H. had 
ended all relationships with Pro Star at that time. 
Loren's understanding was that Ron H. was continuing 
a sub contractor relationship with Pro Star on the 
oavement management system until the existing phase ana 
funds were completed and used. He (Ron) then intenaed 
to end all relationships with Pro Star. 
I asked the" Question why they nad not raised the 
the existing relationship with Kent N. or management 
prior to proceeding with the contract. Their response 
was that they felt that it was between ^ro Star ana 
Ron H. ana further that non-comoete clauses in emcloyee 
agreements wouldn't nold up anyway. 
Kent N. acknowledged that he also was aware of the Ron 
H. relationship with Pro Star, but felt that it was an 
an issue cetween those two parties and that we should 
stay out cf it. 
Seotemoer 29, 1989: Executive Director Meeting 
Harold W., Gary w, and I met with Mr. Findlay to 
present Gary's findings and the issues associated 
with this matter. After a complete discussion of 
all that had happened and was involved, the following 
decisions were made: 
o The deoartment snouia take immediate act-on to 
correct, clarify and adjust its relationship 
witn tie oarties as raoidly as possiole to 
maintain a legal, professional and fair position. 
o 3asea on a legal review by the Attorney General's 
Office action was to be intiAton *~ 
jonn P. Comouter Solutions) as soon as oossiole. 
o Contract modifications ana extensions ce out in 
place immediately to correct payments mace with-
out valid contracts. 
o Adjustments be put in place immediately to 
correct prcolem of payments getting tnrough 
without valid contracts in olace. 
o The contract format associated with this issue be 
re-evaluated to determine if adjustments are 
needed. 
0 In private session with Mr. Finalay, staff 
performance in this matter was aiscussea. It 
was determined that this matter would be con-
sidered further. 
The action prooosed is not intended to ce ounitive 
to any of tne contractors. It is intenaed to take 
immediate senior management action to aajust and 
right the situation as soon as senior management 
became aware of it. Our position is that wnen 
the parties have sorted cut the issues 
aDpropriate!y, we can again consider doing 
business with Aspen and Comouter Solutions. 
Septemoer 29, 1989 PM: 
1 met with Mr. Lee Ford- staff attorney with tne 
Attorney General's Office. I presented a brief 
history of the situation oetween the parties and 
the Department's involvement. I then presented 
the Department's proposed strategy to adjust 
our relationsmo with the parties and correct 
alleged problems. 
Based on that information and a review of the 
language of tne contracts involved, Lee ^. 
advised re to oroceed as proposed. He indicated 
that we Tay have one problem with the 15 day 
termination notice provision in the contracts. 
However ^e suggested that if either of the 
two parties raised concern with being terminated 
without the 15 day notice we just respond by 
The reason to ce usea for tre termination 's to 
be 'the Ceoartment must take action to recuce 
(minimize) its relationship ^ISK in this ratter 
and assure that it attemots to reacn ana main-
tain a legal ana orofessicn* relaticnsmo witn 
all the oarties involvea, if oossicle. 
Seotemoer 29, 1989 
I met with Will McCoy of Pre Star to gain more 
information concerning the identifiea termination 
dates for John Pratt and Ron Hardle. 
The information provided by Will M. is as follows: 
o The legal termination dates recognizee 
by Pro Star are: 
- John Pratt: Marcn 29, -989 < 5uc Zonz.) 
Ron Hardle: September 7, 1989 vVeroal) 
September 22, 1989 \ Letter) 
o Terms of non-compete agreements: 
Employees will not compete with Pro Star 
for one year after terminating with Pro 
Star. 
Sub Contractors will not compete witn Pro 
Star for six months after terminating this 
relationship with Pro Star. 
CoDies of the exact language cf the non-
comcete agreement provisions is filed in 
'documents-original location'. 
Will M. and I discussed the issues some. I explained 
to him that we were preparing to initiate action to 
attemot to clear up our relationship problems with 
the three oarties involved until sucn time as the 
matters oending are more formally resolved. Z also 
discussed nis recollection about wno he naa 
discussed this matter with at the Ceoartment and on 
what occasions (particularly the Ron Hardle matter). 
The fol'cwing is a sunmmary of his response: 
September l) 1989: He discusser* t-Ka o~-
t^»———--— 
any •nvo1vement *n tne Ron H. matter ana reccr.nenaea 
that will M. not ousn the matter if he wan:ea to 
keeo °is business with the Department (this was not 
a Decartment response nor -ormal resocnsei . 
'Seot^emoer '^  1939: Will M. introduced tne :on H 
matter to Kent N. on the phone 
(^ JSeptemoe r_j UJ 1 939 : Will M. met with Kent N. to 
discuss the issue indeoth. He informed Kent that 
legal action may oe generated between Pro Star and 
Ron ~.
 f but that it was not the intent of P^o Star 
to pr-ng the Department into the matter formally 
or -egat'y. Kent's response was 'we' do not want * 
get "^ the middle of the matter- it is a prcolem 
between Pro Star and Ron H., the Department "s not 
invo • /ea. 
Octccer 2„]1989 (^cnday): 
I met with ^ohn Pratt to notify him that the Deoartment 
would terminate its relationship with his comoany 
effective CctoDer 2, 1939. I explained the reasors and 
need for tr.e termination and that we would be hacoy to 
Lonsi der) worki ng with m m again as soon as we haa some 
rorm of confirmation that the issues relatea to ^~s 
relationsn,o with Pro Star are resoivea. 
I also cisc-ssea the need for a contract amencment to 
esjtajpjisn a case for m s payments for the pence; 
30 through CctoDer ° We agreed that I wou '• a 
noTTfy m m «nen the amenament is ready for m s signature 
so that he could review and sign it. 
In this meeting ne provided me with his opinions en the 
relationship issues at the time he contracted with the 
Deoartment ana at present. 
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"AN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Zric C. Olson (4108) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
3 :• South Main S t r e e t , Su i t e 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3332 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN P. PRATT, ) 
Plaintiff, ) ORDER GRANTING 
) DIRECTED VERDICT 
vs. ) 
PRODATA, INC., et al. , ) Civil No. 900902742CV 
Defendant. ) Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence in this 
action on March 20, 1991, the defendants moved this Court for a 
directed verdict as to the plaintiff s Second Claim for Relief 
m the Complaint and certain elements of the plaintiff's First 
Claim for Relief. The Court having considered the evidence 
introduced by the plaintiff, the pleadings in this action, the 
arguments of counsel and being otherwise sufficiently advised, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the defendants' 
Motion for Directed Verdict is granted as to the plaintiff's 
Second Claim for Relief and as to all bases for the plaintiff s 
First Claim for Relief except "improper purpose" and intentional 
misrepresentation as an "improper means." The Court finds that, 
as to the Second Claim for Relief, when the plaintiff s evidence 
g \wDi\132\OOOQOm9b W51 
is viewed in the light most favorable to him, reasonable minds 
wcuid not differ that the noncompetition covenant in the 1988 
Subcontract between Prodata, Inc. and John P. Pratt did not 
supersede the noncompetition covenant in the 1985 Employment 
Agreement and there was no modification of such obligations as a 
matter of law. The Court further finds that, with respect to 
all bases for liability under the First Claim for Relief other 
than "improper purpose" and intentional misrepresentation as an 
"improper means, " the plaintiff failed to set forth such bases 
in his Complaint and, when the plaintiff's evidence is viewed in 
the light most favorable to him, reasonable minds would not 
differ that these bases cannot be established. The Court 
farther finds that, as a matter of law, negligent 
misrepresentation cannot serve as the basis for the intentional 
tort of interference with economic relations. 
Pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, all other issues are submitted to the jury subject to 
a later determination of this Court of the legal issues raised 
in the defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict upon a timely 
motion by the defendants^ for judgmer^ notwithstanding verdict. 
DATED 
e f e n d a n t s ' t o r juagmenr notv 
tM. $ftey of JHBM991. 
r ick, Judge 
D i s t r i c t 
g \ w o l \ 1 3 2 \ 0 O O 0 0 m 9 b W51 
Approved as to Form: 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
g \wc :32\OOOOOm9D.W5i 
Tab 5 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN P. PRATT, : SPECIAL VERDICT 
Plaintiffs, : CIVIL NO. 900902742 CV 
vs. : 
PRODATA, INC., et al., : 
Defendants. 
We, the jury, now answer the following questions as our 
y*i11HiiitfrtyM verdict in this case: 
1. Did the defendants intentionally interfere with the 
plaintiff's economic relations with the Utah Department of 
Transportation? 
ANSWER: Yes )( No 
If your answer to question 1 is NO, do not answer questions 
2 through 7, and proceed directly to question 8. 
2. Did the defendants act for an improper purpose in 
interfering with the plaintiff's economic relations with the 
Utah Department of Transportation? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
-2-
3. In determining whether the defendants enplcved 
improper means in interfering with the plaintiff's ecor.:ric 
relations with the Utah Department of Transportation, please 
answer the following: 
a. Did the defendants nake a false statement abo^t a 
presently existing fact to the Utah Department cf 
Transportation? 
ANSWER: Yes No V 
b. Did the defendants know that the statement *as 
false or make the statement without sufficient knowledge? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
c. Did the defendants, in making the staterent, 
intend to induce the Utah Department of Transportation to 
act in reliance on the statement? 
ANSWER: Yes Y No 
d. Did the Utah Department of Transportation act 
with justification on the statement? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
If your answer to question 2 and your answer to any of the 
four subparts of question 3 5 ^ NO, do not answer questions 4 
through 7 and proceed directly to question 8. 
-3-
4. Did the defendants' intentional interference with tr.e 
plaintiff's economic relations with the Utah Department cf 
Transportation proximately cause an injury to the plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
If your answer to question 4 is NO, do not answer questions 
5 through 7 and proceed directly to question 8. 
5. Were the defendants privileged to interfere with the 
plaintiff's economic relations with the Utah Department cf 
Transportation? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
If your answer to question 5 is S3~, do not answer questions 
6 and 7 and proceed directly to question 8. 
6. Did the plaintiff recognize the risk of harm to 
himself by reason of the defendants' actions but thereafter 
intentionally or heedlessly fail to protect his own interests? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
*££ 
If your answer to question 6 is -SB, do not answer question 
7 and proceed directly to question 8. 
7. State the amount of the plaintiff's out-of-pocket and 
consequential damages caused by the defendants' interference 
-4-
with the plaintiff's existing or future economic relations witr. 
f. A rfW/Wfxtortiie <Ui»*j** **tfkopfi& 
8. Did the defendant Prodata waive enforcement of the 
noncompetition clause in the Employment Agreement? 
ANSWER: Yes No X. 
If your answer to question 8 is YES, do not answer any 
further questions. Instead, the foreperson should sign the 
Special Verdict where provided below and notify the Court. 
9. Did the defendant Prodata inexcusably delay asserting 
the plaintiff's breach of contract, thereby prejudicing the 
plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
UUS 
If your answer to question 9 is *tr, do not answer any 
further questions. Instead, the foreperson should sign the 
Special Verdict where provided below and notify the Court. 
10. Did the defendant Prodata suffer actual damages by 
reason of the plaintiff's breach of the noncompetition clause 
in the Employment Agreement? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
If your answer to question 10 is NO, do not answer any 
further questions. Instead, the foreperson should sign the 
Special Verdict where provided below and notify the Court. 
-5-
11. Did tnere exist a reasonable relationship between the 
$25,000 set as liquidated damages in the Employment Agreerent 
and the actual damages to be contemplated as arising fror a 
breach at the tine that the Employment Agreement was signed? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
If your answer to question 11 is NO, do not answer any 
further questions. Instead, the foreperson should sign the 
Special Verdict where provided below and notify the Court. 
12. State the defendant Prodata's damages proximately 
caused by the plaintiff's breach of the Erployment Agreement. 
$ 
Dated this Z / day of March, 1991. 
FOREPERSON \ 
Tab 6 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
If the plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendants intentionally interfered with the 
plaintiff's economic relations with the UDOT, the plaintiffs 
then have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendants, in so interfering, either acted 
with an improper purpose or employed improper means. The 
alternative of improper purpose requires evidence that the 
defendants' predominant or primary purpose was to injure the 
plaintiff. It is not enough to prove that the defendants 
intended in the short run to injure the plaintiff if their long 
range objective was to advance their economic interests. The 
law offers no remedy for injuries that are solely the result of 
competition in the rough and tumble of the marketplace. The 
defendants will be deemed to have an improper purpose only if 
the plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the defendants'actions were motivated by a predominant purpose 
to injure the plaintiff as an end in itself or, in other words, 
for the sake of injury alone. 
Tab 7 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Privilege is a complete defense to an action for 
intentional interference with economic relations. In other 
words, if proven, privilege will prevent the plaintiff from 
recovering even if all elements of intentional interference are 
proven. If you find that the plaintiff has met his burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and 
convincing evidence as the case may be, each fact necessary to 
establish a claim of intentional interference with economic 
relations, then you must consider whether the defendants have 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that they were 
privileged to act as they did. The defendants have the 
privilege to assert and protect their economic and legal rights. 
In so doing, the defendants must proceed in good faith. The 
standard is not whether the defendants were correct or incorrect 
in believing that the plaintiff had breached his employment 
agreement, but whether they entertained an honest belief that 
such was the case. The defendants are also privileged to use 
appropriate means to cause the nonperformance of an agreement 
forbidden by statute. If you find that the defendants were 
privileged to assert their rights under the employment agreement 
or to prevent an illegal performance, then you must render a 
verdict in favor of the defendants. 
Tab 8 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3>£ 
The d e f e n d a n t P r o d a t a s e e k s t o r e c o v e r damages f o r t h e 
p l a i n t i f f s a l l e g e d b r e a c h of h i s n o n c o m p e t i t i o n o b l i g a t i o n s u n d e r 
t h e S e p t e m b e r 23, 1985 Employment Agreemen t b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s . 
Under Utah law, s u c h n o n c o m p e t i t i o n a g r e e m e n t s a r e e n f o r c e a b l e 
a g a i n s t an employee i f s u p p o r t e d by c o n s i d e r a t i o n , no t i n d u c e d by 
bad f a i t h , n e c e s s a r y t o p r o t e c t t h e e m p l o y e r ' s g o o d w i l l , and 
r e a s o n a b l e as t o a r e a and t i m e r e s t r i c t i o n s . The p l a i n t i f f has 
r a i s e d no i s s u e as t o t h e s e e l e m e n t s and t h e C o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e 
n o n c o m p e t i t i o n p r o v i s i o n s of t h e Employment Agreement meet t h e s e 
s t a n d a r d s . The p l a i n r i f f does a l l e g e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t P r o d a t a 
wa ived e n f o r c e m e n t of t h e Employment Agreement . Waiver i s t h e 
v o l u n t a r y , i n t e n t i o n a l r e l i n q u i s h m e n t of a known r i g h t . To p r o v e 
a w a i v e r c f t h e Employment Agreemen t , t h e p l a i n r i f f must p r o v e by 
a p r e p o n d e r a n c e of t h e e v i d e n c e : 
a. That a r igh t to br ing an ac t ion against the 
p l a i n t i f f existed. 
b. That the defendant Prodata had knowledae of t ha t 
r i gh t and all facts relevant thereto. 
c. That by some d i s t i n c t , unequivocal and decis ive 
act , the defendant Prodata i n t e n t i o n a l l y and 
vo lun t a r i l y gave up t h a t r i gh t . 
Tab 9 
Q (By Mr. Broadbent) Okay. Tell us when approxi-
mately, if you can fix it as closely as you can, when this 
first conversation took place in which Will McCoy mentioned 
John Pratt. 
A Would have to be the third week in September 1989, 
just -- if not on the day, the day prior to my going to work 
for the Utah Department of Transportation. 
Q Do you remember what that day was that you went to 
the Utah Department of Transportation? 
A Not specifically. 
Q But it was close to the third week? 
A Somewhere around the 20th, something like that. 
Q Tell us what you remember about the statement that 
was made on or about that date by Mr. McCoy about John Pratt, 
A The statement I received from Mr. McCoy was that I 
was to stay away from John Pratt and another gentleman that 
happened to be out there, Ron Hartle. 
Q Did Mr. McCoy at any time make any statement about 
action he might be going to take against John Pratt? 
A I had known that — 
MR. OLSON: Your Honor, I object. This isn't 
responsive and I think the question itself is leading. 
THE COURT: It is not responsive. 
Mr. Crocker, I want you to listen to the question 
and answer the question only, and it is leading, that's 
116 
j agreed/ so let's reframe the question and let's see if we can 
2 start over. 
3 Q (By Mr. Broadbent) What else do you remember/ if 
4 anything, that was said in that statement where he said to 
5 stay away from John Pratt and Ron Hartle? 
6 I A I asked who the gentlemen were. It was indicated 
7 to me that they were people that prior to that point had been 
8 referred to namelessly either in other casual conversations 
9 at our monthly luncheons or, you know/ kicked around the 
10 office. 
11 Q How could you tell that they were referred to 
12 previously maybe without a name? 
13 A I knew they were referred to previously because 
14 everyone was basically informed that two contractors had 
15 taken contracts away from Pro-Star and their names were not 
16 mentioned/ and I don't know why I wasn't privy to that until 
17 I was to go to UDOT. Then it became imperative that I knew 
18 who they were so that I could stay away from them. 
19 Q Was there any explanation as to why you should stay 
20 away from them? 
21 It wasn't explicit. Basically every contractor 
22 that goes to work for Pro-Star signs a no compete clause. 
23 Being informed that John Pratt and Ron Hartle had taken 
24 contracts away from Pro-Star means they violated, you knowf 
25 that compete clause# so to me, it was clear that you stay 
^ A Yes, I did meet him. 
2 Q Do you know whether he was there the entire time 
3 you were there? 
4 A Yes, he was there the entire time I was there. 
5 Q So you were there two weeks and he was there for 
g those entire two weeks? 
7 A Yes. 
g Q After you were done at UDOT, where did you go then? 
9 A After I was done at UDOT, I went back to Pro-Star's 
10 office where I stayed for about a month. 
11 Q Did you ever see John Pratt after that? 
12 A Yes, I did. 
13 Q When did you see him? 
14 A To the best of my knowledge, it was about the 
15 middle of October and he showed up at Pro-Star's office. 
16 Q And tell us what happened on that occasion. 
17 A I saw John Pratt and, to the best of my knowledge, 
18 Ron Hartle go into Will McCoy's office and the doors were 
19 shut. Some discussion went on that I have no knowledge of. 
20 Q And who did you see go into the office? Was it 
21 just those three people? 
22 A To the best of my recollection, yes. 
23 Q And one of those was Will McCoy? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q And the other one was? 
1 1 Q 
1 A John Pratt. 
2 I Q And do you think the other one was Ron Hartle? 
3 A I think the other one was Ron Hartle but I'm not 
4 sure. 
5 Q Did Will McCoy ever say what happened in that 
g meeting? 
7 A After the meeting, Mr. McCoy came out and basically 
8 addressed the individuals that were present, indicating that 
9 Mr. Pratt was going to give up his contract at UDOT and pay 
10 some form of restitution. 
11 Q But did Mr. McCoy have any particular emotion when 
12 he came out? Was he sad? Angry? Happy? 
13 A I would say — 
14 MR. OLSON: Your Honor, I would like a little more 
15 foundation, and I think the question should be rephrased such 
16 that it relates to this individual's observation as opposed 
17 to simply a statement on Mr. McCoy's — 
18 THE COURT: Well, the question is leading. The 
19 objection is sustained. Let's form it in a nonleading 
20 fashion, Counsel. 
21 Q (By Mr. Broadbent) Okay. Did you see Mr. McCoy 
22 express any emotion when he came out from that meeting? 
23 A In my opinion, he was quite pleased. He was 
24 smiling, laughing, seemed to be in good spirits. 
25 Q Did it appear to you that he was happy about the 
1 briefly on this matter? 
2 THE COURT: Very well. 
3 (Whereupon, discussion was held at the bench out of 
4 the hearing of the jury and the Reporter.) 
5 MR. BROADBENT: Could we approach the bench for 
6 just a moment? 
7 (Whereupon, discussion was held at the bench out of 
g the hearing of the jury and the Reporter.) 
9 Q (By Mr. Broadbent) Mr. Crocker, have you now told 
10 us everything that you can remember that Pro-Star or 
11 Mr. McCoy said to you regarding John Pratt? 
12 A Well, no, not really. 
13 Q Specifically, and we're not interested in things 
14 that are just office conversation kinds of things, but tell 
15 us anything else that you remember that you haven't told us 
16 about already, any other statement that Mr. McCoy has made 
17 regarding John Pratt and we'll — 
18 A Okay. What I have to do is back up in time. Not 
19 knowing at the time who John Pratt was and not having his 
20 name mentioned, a statement at a luncheon by Mr. McCoy and 
21 also backed up by Mr. Basham was that contractors had taken 
22 contracts, consequently, money away from Pro-Star, that they 
23 had violated their no compete clause and Pro-Star intended to 
24 make an example of them. 
25 Q Do you remember when that statement was made? 
1 A That statement was made while I was out at Eaton-
2 Kenway about half way through my contract, so that would put 
3 it about the middle of June. 
4 Q Okay, so the middle of June of '89 you heard a 
5 statement, you heard this statement that you've just 
6 described to us? 
7 A Yes, 
8 Q Any other — tell us first of all who made this 
9 statement that you just quoted. 
10 THE COURT: Well, Counsel, seems to me we're being 
11 unduly repetitive here. The witness has already testified 
12 that it was made by Mr. McCoy. That's the whole purpose of 
13 this inquiry, so let's not replow the same ground. 
14 Q (By Mr. Broadbent) You'd indicated Mr. Basham was 
15 there and it wasn't clear to me whether this was a discussion 
16 or whether it was actually a statement. 
17 A The statement was not made by Mr. Basham. 
18 Q Okay. Any other statements that you can remember 
19 Mr. McCoy making about John Pratt? 
20 A The only other statement that I remember being made 
21 was a statement that UDOT was a Pro-Star client and was going 
22 to remain a Pro-Star client, and therefore by going into Pro-
23 Star on their own, John Pratt and Ron Hartle had opened 
24 themselves up to a lawsuit and would basically have to get 
25 out. 
1 he was saying had happened or were being done; is that 
2 correct? It was hearsay to you, 
3 A No, hearsay is something you hear from someone else 
4 in reference to another individual. When Mr. McCoy addressed 
5 me and told me to stay away from John Pratt, I think that was 
6 all too clear and not hearsay. 
7 Q When he told you that some contractors had taken 
8 contracts away from Pro-Star, you didn't know whether that 
9 was so or not, it was just something Mr. McCoy was telling 
10 you. 
11 A Yes. 
12 Of Okay, and you understood all along and throughout 
13 this thing what was motivating those statements was the fact 
14 that somebody at Pro-Star believed there had been a violation 
15 of some noncompetition clauses, right? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q And throughout the time as you observed those 
18 individuals who were making these statements, Mr. McCoy 
19 specifically, it was clear that he sincerely believed that 
20 that was the case. 
21 A That's my belief. 
22 MR. OLSON: Yes. That's all I have. 
23 THE COURT: All right. 
24 MR. BROADBENT: Nothing further, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Crocker, you may step 
1 OC 
Tab 10 
clients in the state and the subject of John Pratt came up 
and tlSi gist of the conversation was that Will was unhappy 
with John Pratt's conduct of terminating his contract and 
going to work directly for a client. He felt — his comments 
were the frame that it was unethical and he was quite unhappy 
with John. 
Q From being at Pro-Star in this two-month period, 
did you know where John Pratt was working before he termi-
nated with Pro-Star? 
A It was up at an office there on Social Hall Avenue. 
I believe it was the Department of Transportation or — I'm 
not sure just what department at the time. 
Q So you're not sure what department, but Mr. McCoy 
was upset because he thought that John Pratt had done some-
thing wrong? 
A Yes. 
THE COURT: Counsel, there's no reason to restate 
the answer of a witness. He's your witness. 
MR. BROADBENT: I have no further questions, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, you may cross-examine. 
MR. BROADBENT: Excuse me. Before we do that, I'd 
like to ask the witness to, if you would, place on this time 
line — we'll use yellow — the time frame in which this 
conversation with Mr. McCoy took place. 
194 
Tab 11 
exception. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. Broadbent) Did you later have any other 
conversations with Will McCoy in which John Pratt was 
mentioned? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q When was the next conversation that you remember 
having with him? 
A I believe it was on May 3rd, 1989. 
Q And what did Mr. McCoy say on that occasion about 
John Pratt? 
A He was telling me that he believed that I should 
not have any dealings with Mr. Pratt because he believed that 
he was a bad influence on me. 
Q Did he say anything else? 
A He said that he had done several things that were 
professional unethical and that he — he said that he could 
not elaborate, but he said that he had done things that were 
far worse than anything I knew about. 
Q Did you know about anything unethical that 
Mr. Pratt had done? 
A The only thing that I had known about that could 
even be construed in my mind as touching upon a lack of 
ethics was his transition from being a Pro-Star employee to a 
subcontractor. 
202 
1 Q There was something about that that you thought was 
2 inappropriate? 
3 A I thought that it was. 
4 Q That isn't in this time frame, though, is it? 
5 A That was -- wasn't that much earlier? 
6 A It was, yes, in fact, it was. 
7 Q You're talking about when he changed from an 
8 employee to a subcontractor? 
9 A That was at the time that I first became a Pro-Star 
10 employee that it occurred. 
11 Q And that actually happened before you were employed 
12 by Pro-Star; isn't that right? 
13 A Yes, it had. 
14 MR. BROADBENT: I have nothing further, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: All right, you may cross-examine. 
16 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
17 BY MR. OLSON: 
18 Q Mr. Broadbent neglected to ask you what was it that 
19 you thought in your mind might be possibly unethical 
20 Mr. Pratt had done in relation to his switching from an 
21 employment agreement to a subcontractor? 
22 MR. BROADBENT: Your Honor, I don't think there's 
23 any relevance. 
24 THE COURT: May not be, Counsel, but you raised it 
25 on direct examination. The objection's overruled. You may 
inquire. 
THE WITNESS: I believe that the client had some 
pressure put upon them to act according to John's wishes 
because he was in charge of the project and they couldn't 
afford to lose him. 
Q (By Mr. Olson) So Mr, Pratt, in your experience as 
well when you were with Employment Security, was a vital part 
of what was going on there as far as Pro-Star was rendering 
services for Employment Security; is that correct? 
A He was the foremost resource as far as this 
project. 
tj And your understanding was that if he would have 
walked away back when he had the employment agreement and 
done what — and as he threatened to do, that would have 
created a severe problem for Pro-Star in terms of staffing 
and making the client happy in that particular situation; 
isn't that correct? 
A It's conceivable, yes. 
§ And so the unethical thing you thought perhaps was 
there was something a bit coercive in terms of his seeking a 
subcontract where he was such an essential part of the opera-
tion and things were sort of in the middle of getting done; 
is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Did Mr. McCoy ever explain to you what he 
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1 invited into and we were asked to go to another place, and we 
2 did. 
3 Q You didn't hear anything that happened in that 
4 meeting? 
5 A No, sure didn't. 
6 Q Did you see Mr. Neal Christensen come out — 
7 A No, I did not. 
8 Q — of that meeting? 
9 Did you see who went in besides Mr. Neal 
10 Christensen and Will McCoy? 
11 A No, no. 
12 Q Did Mr. McCoy come out after that meeting? 
13 A Yes, he did. 
14 Q Did you talk to him after the meeting? 
15 A We chatted. 
16 Q Did you talk to him about the meeting? 
17 A Yeah, I was interested in what was going on, of 
18 course. I was pretty dedicated to Pro-Star at that time and 
19 their business was my business/ so yeah, I was interested in 
20 what was happening. 
21 Q Tell us what was said and by whom relating to that 
22 meeting. 
23 A To the best of my recollection, it was stated that 
24 Mr. Pratt and another gentleman had broken their contracts/ 
25 which is a no-competition contract with Pro-Star, and had 
1 sought contracts on their own behalf, and that Pro-Star 
2 couldn't afford to let that happen and that's the reason they 
3 signed a no-competition agreement with their employees, and 
4 that they really didn't want that to happen and be part of 
5 the business and they had to make some kind of a statement to 
6 the rest of the business world. 
7 Q Was there anything else that you remember Mr. McCoy 
8 saying about his meeting with Mr. Christensen? 
9 4 He just said that UDOT was in an uncomfortable 
10 position but were willing to work it out in a businesslike 
11 fashion. 
12 Q Did he say what kind of a fashion they were going 
13 to work it out? 
14 A No, I wasn't privy to any of that information. 
15 Q Do you remember Mr. McCoy saying anything else 
16 about his meeting with Mr. Christensen? 
17 A No, that was pretty much his business at his level. 
18 Q Did Mr. McCoy ever mention John Pratt? 
19 A Yes, he did. 
20 Q Tell me in what time frame you remember Mr. McCoy 
21 saying something. 
22 A From before September, it started, I guess, when 
23 Mr. Pratt left the — his original contract and went out to 
24 DOT, there was a little scuttlebutt around. 
25 Q And when was that? 
1 A That would be three or four months prior. 
2 Q Prior to what? 
3 A Prior to September. It was in the summer sometime. 
4 Q Okay, so you remember some discussion there. What 
5 was the substance of that discussion? 
6 A The substance was that — 
7 MR. OLSON: Your Honor, I don't think there's 
8 enough foundation for this testimony. 
9 THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure, Counsel, that there 
10 is, either. I think we need to, as best we can, pinpoint 
11 when it occurred, who was present and then what was said by 
12 whom. 
13 Q (By Mr. Broadbent) Okay. You're saying that this 
14 conversation took place about three months before September, 
15 so that would have put it in what, June? 
16 A Correct. 
17 Q Of '89? 
18 A Somewhere around there. 
19 Q And who was there besides yourself? 
20 A At this point it was some of the project directors 
21 that were being brought on board. We had a weekly meeting 
22 and there was a little discussion about it. *There was more 
23 discussion at a later time towards September on kind of like 
24 a case study on the whole thing, and our information was that 
25 Mr. Pratt had broken his agreement with Pro-Star. 
1 \ Q Do you remember any other discussions with Will 
2 McCoy about John Pratt? 
3 A Nothing was really said derogatory about Mr. Pratt 
4 the whole time. It's ]ust business practice. 
5 Q Now, as you sit here today, have you told us 
6 everything you can remember about what Mr. McCoy said about 
7 John Pratt or what he said about his meeting with Mr. Neal 
8 Christensen? 
9 A To the best of my knowledge, yeah. 
10 Q Let me have you refer, if I could, to your deposi-
11 tion, Mr. Christensen. I'm looking at page 32. 
12 Your Honor, I don't know how we're going to do this 
13 without an original, but I move to publish. 
14 THE COURT: Well, is the document given to the 
15 witness a copy of his deposition? 
16 MR. BROADBENT: It is. Shall we hand it up? 
17 THE COURT: Well, no, I needn't see it. 
18 MR. OLSON: I'm going to object at this time. I 
19 don't know what use he intends to put this deposition to, but 
20 Mr* Christensen's given us the benefit of all his recollec-
21 tion as it exists to date. If it's impeachment, I don't know 
22 what's to impeach. 
23 MR. BROADBENT: He apparently had a better recol-
24 lection when his deposition was taken. 
25 THE COURT: Well, then, let's do it this way. If 
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Q (By Mr, Broadbent) When is the next time that you 
remember Mr. McCoy saying anything about John Pratt, or was 
there another occasion where he said something? 
A I don't think he ever talked to me anymore about 
John Pratt. 
Q Okay. Did you sign a contract when you started 
working for Pro-Star? 
A Yes. 
Q And did that contain a covenant not to compete with 
Pro-Star? 
A Now, you're talking two things. You're talking 
about when I started with Pro-Star and then also when I was 
as a subcontractor to Pro-Star, so there really was two 
contracts. 
Q Okay. 
A Okay. 
Q All right, so you signed both of them? 
A Yes. 
Q And I guess originally you signed an employee 
agreement; is that right? 
A That's correct. 
Q And then later on you signed a subcontractor 
agreement? 
A That's correct. 
Q Did there come a time when you stopped doing 
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1 circumstances was and I told him the same thing. 
2 Shortly after that, or I think it was the same 
3 telephone conversation, I got a call -- I talked to Bill 
4 Basham who is the owner of Pro-Star/Prodata and at that time 
5 he indicated that he would take whatever means he could to 
6 get me out of UDOT. 
7 Q Now, after you stopped doing subcontract work for 
8 Pro-Star, did you continue then doing computer consulting 
9 work? 
10 A Yes, I did at UDOT. 
11 Q And did you have an arrangement or a contract with 
12 UDOT? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q Did you have a contract with them? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q And following this discussion that you just testi-
17 fied about with Mr. McCoy and Mr. Basham on the telephone, 
18 was your contract with UDOT terminated? 
19 A Shortly thereafter, yes* There were some things 
20 that happened in the meantime, though, because I had inter-
21 action and had interaction all along with my attorney con-
22 cerning the legality of what I was doing and I was assured 
23 that it was perfectly legal. 
24 Q When was your contract at UDOT terminated? 
25 A On October 2nd, 1989. 
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the contracts that you had entered into with Prodata? 
A I don't recall that we specifically talked about 
it, but I'm sure they were aware of that. 
Q You don't recall a specific conversation? 
A I don't recall a specific conversation. 
Q Now, if I had some dots and I wanted to put a dot 
at the point in time where the one year expired from when you 
terminated the employment agreement, that would be approxi-
mately the line that commences May 1; isn't that right? That 
was one year after you terminated employment; is that right? 
A Yes, that's correct. 
Q And so assuming that the jury or the law doesn't 
agree with your perception that these contracts superseded 
each other, you would have had an existing obligation not to 
compete through the end of April of 1989; isn't that true? 
A That's right. 
Q And when you went to work for UDOT, you at least 
recognized the potential that those two months might fall 
under the noncompetition provision that was included in your 
employment agreement, didn't you? 
A I didn't consider that to be a factor at all. 
Q You hadn't discussed that? 
A That agreement had been superseded. 
Q You hadn't discussed that with Prodata to find out 
what their view of it was, did you? 
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& That's right — 
# And so — 
A -- not to my knowledge. 
Q You have no personal knowledge that Mr. McCoy ever 
was privy to what Mr. Christensen may have said in response 
to you in your letter of November 1989, do you? 
A That's correct. 
Q And when the final letter was sent, which was the 
February 16, 1990 letter which is Exhibit 10, once again, the 
letter was to you, Mr. Pratt, from Mr. Christensen, director 
of administrative services out at UDOT, right? 
A Yes. 
Q There was no copy sent to Mr. McCoy or anyone at 
Pro-Star? 
A To my knowledge. 
Q So your dialogue after that first meeting with 
Mr. McCoy and Mr. Zaba was exclusively with UDOT? 
A I was told by Mr. McCoy that I would need to talk 
to you if I had anything to say to Pro-Star. 
Q And did you direct your attorney to speak with me? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And did your attorney advise you of anything that 
had been said in conversations between him and me? 
A Nothing other than your initial position that I 
needed to pay money in order to get back to UDOT. 
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Q So you were told that a dollar offer of settlement 
had been made on behalf of Pro-Star, right? 
A Yes. 
Q And you were fundamentally opposed to paying a 
penny? 
A Absolutely, absolutely. 
Q And you'd rather be in this litigation than pay a 
penny; is that right? 
A I would rather have had Pro-Star act responsibly 
and let me get on equal economic footing before we discussed 
any problem they had with me. I would rather they had come 
to me directly, yes. 
Q But the fact is, you would rather be in litigation 
than pay a penny to Pro-Star. 
A I would not pay money to someone who had caused me 
damage in order to extort that money from me, in my words. 
Q That's not the question. 
A Rather than do that, yes, I would rather be here. 
Q So you felt it was extortion? Is that your word, 
extortion? 
A I felt that they were — that they got me kicked 
out of UDOT, that they put me at an economic disadvantage and 
then demanded money before I could go back on an issue that 
they never felt any real — that there was any real issue or 
at least to my knowledge, they never had contacted me. There 
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didn't seem to be any issue until they did that damage. 
Q But when the topic came up, they told you how the 
problem could be solved, didn't they? 
A Yes. 
Q And that was to pay around $4,000, right? 
A Yes, they did. 
Q And you never made a counter offer so nobody even 
negotiated the matter, did they? 
A No, we did not negotiate the matter, no. 
Q When you came to Pro-Star back in May of 1988 and 
said, "I want $28 an hour," they negotiated with you and a 
figure was arrived upon that was mutually acceptable by both 
of you, didn't you? 
A I think it would have been unlikely that had I 
gotten them kicked out of the Department of Employment 
Security and then asked them — 
Q I want to — 
THE COURT: Just a minute, folks, you've got to 
speak one at a time. 
MR. OLSON: Your Honor, I would like the witness to 
answer the question that I asked him. 
THE COURT: Mr. Pratt, I want you to listen to the 
question and answer the question only. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Your attorney will be able to elicit 
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from you any information he feels is necessary. 
(|: (By Mr. Olson) And my question was simply this, 
that when you asked for $28 an hour in May of 1988 as part of 
the new subcontract, Prodata negotiated with you and you came 
up with a mutually agreeable figure between yourselves as to 
what the payment should be under the subcontract, right? 
A That's correct, 
Q But when Prodata offered you an initial sum of a 
possible settlement and they never said that it was a drop-
dead offer, that is, that you either accept this or nothing, 
you refused to even come back with anything, didn't you? 
A I felt the circumstances were dramatically 
different, Mr. Olson. 
Q Okay, but you didn't come back with anything, did 
you? 
A I did not. 
Q And in fact, after that moment in time, you never 
had any more discussions and to your knowledge, the attorneys 
had no more discussions about the possibility of resolving 
this matter short of litigation; is that right? 
A That's correct. 
Q* And you recognized at that time that the conse-
quence of not resolving the matter was you would not get back 
the work at UDOT unless you could persuade Mr. Christensen to 
the contrary. 
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A That's right, 
Q Okay, and you knew that not going back to work at 
UDOT might result in your being deprived, in your own testi-
mony, deprived of contracts exceeding $84,000; isn't that 
correct? 
A I had no knowledge of any figures at that time, 
Q But you recognized there was some — 
A I recognized that there was some dollars involved. 
Q Tens of thousands of dollars? 
A Yes. 
Q And you also knew, did you not, that Mr. Hartle, in 
fact, did make a settlement with Pro-Star and he went back 
and worked at UDOT; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Now, Computer Solutions, is that a corporation? 
A No, it's not. 
Q Is it a partnership? 
A It's a sole proprietorship. 
Q It's basically a name you call yourself; is that 
correct? 
A It is a business I started that I own individually, 
yes. 
Q It doesn't have separate shares of stock or — 
A It does not. 
Q — cert i f icates? I t ' s basically a dba, right? 
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done with respect to UDOT, other than rumors, whatever you'd 
heard from people? 
A Everything that I had was hearsay. That's all I 
could get. 
Q You weren't in any of the meetings with Mr. McCoy 
or Mr. Christensen; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And you weren't privy to whatever Mr. Findlay said, 
did or thought when he was making the decision to terminate 
you; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And when you were advised you were terminated, it 
wasn't, "Mr. Pratt, you're out of here and never come back," 
it was, "Mr. Pratt, you're out of here, but if you can 
resolve things with Prodata, you're welcome to come back." 
A Yes. 
Q Those were the terms. It wasn't just cutting you 
loose; isn't that correct? 
A That's correct. 
MR. OLSON: That's all I have. 
MR. BROADBENT: Nothing further, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, you'd better step down, 
Mr. Pratt, while you have a chance. 
Call your next witness• 
MR. BROADBENT: Your Honor, we have a need to call 
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